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ABSTRACT 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius may be known, in both the 
popular and academic commentaries, as the case about the Affordable Care Act’s Individual 
Mandate provision.  History may record it as one of the most significant cases in the jurisprudence 
of cooperative federalism.  In invalidating part of the Medicaid Expansion provision, the Roberts 
Court became the first to invalidate a federal spending statute as unconstitutionally coercive of 
state governments.  This decision has the potential to impact federal-state cooperative 
arrangements such as No Child Left Behind, and others far beyond the health care context. 
This Article argues that lack of attention to the Medicaid challenge, and the judiciary’s previous 
inability to articulate a framework for coercion, indicates the inappropriateness of our dominant 
conceptions of federalism enforcement for an age of cooperative governance.  To the extent that 
claims of coercion require us to take into account the national-state interaction over time, they offer 
the opportunity to transcend current frameworks in federalism enforcement, which disregard the 
bureaucratic dimension of policy implementation, and operate under a separatist paradigm with 
respect to national and state authority.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s decision in National 
Federation exemplifies the extent to which federalism enforcement continues to be dominated by 
each of these conceptions of federalism enforcement.  As a result, federalism enforcement remains 
institutionally and temporally truncated, focusing solely on Congress and legislative enactment to  
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the exclusion of administrative agencies and post-enactment policy implementation.  In this 
framework, the unrealistic norm of separation reigns supreme. 
This Article argues that a norm of engagement better exemplifies the relationship inaugurated 
between states and the national government in the context of cooperative federalism.  Medicaid in 
particular stands as a model of the embedded interactions between states and the national 
government.  This engagement of policy implementation takes place in administrative agencies.  
The national-state relationship at the agency level involves repeated interaction aimed at the 
achievement of policy objectives.  These repeated interactions demonstrate the need for a norm of 
federalism enforcement that exemplifies the ways in which states and the national government 
remain vulnerable in their interaction with one another.  Such a norm is available by looking to 
administrative agency practice and administrative law doctrine.  This norm is capable of 
reorienting Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, and federalism enforcement, more broadly.   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 93 
I. FEDERALISM AS JURISDICTIONAL SEPARATION ....................... 106 
A. Federalism’s Politics:  Allocation in the Debate Over 
National Authority ........................................................ 107 
1. Debating the Spending Power in Early America .......... 107 
2. Debating Early Cooperative Federalism:  Protecting 
State Separation ..................................................... 110 
B. Power Allocation in Twentieth Century Tenth Amendment 
Jurisprudence ............................................................... 111 
C. Identifying Sovereignty’s Core:  Allocation in the Post-New 
Deal Era ...................................................................... 112 
1. Protecting Fundamental State Power ......................... 112 
2. Protecting Fundamental State Institutions ................. 114 
II. POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS:  THE RE-ZONING OF POWER 
ALLOCATION .......................................................................... 117 
A. Federalism as Power Allocation and Institutional 
Monopolization ............................................................ 118 
1. The Traditional Model:  Wechsler and Choper ............ 118 
2. Rejecting Political Safeguards and Accepting 
Allocation ............................................................. 120 
B. Updating Political Safeguards:  Larry Kramer’s 
Misdiagnosis ................................................................ 122 
III. MEDICAID:  INTERACTION AND THE PRACTICE OF 
FEDERALISM ........................................................................... 126 
A. The Road to Medicare:  Non-Inevitable Interaction ............ 127 
1. Steps Toward a Federal Role in the Era of Futility ....... 127 
2. The Road Toward Medicaid and Federalism’s 
Interaction ............................................................ 129 
Oct. 2012] BEYOND SEPARATION 93 
 
B. Medicaid:  The Paradigm of Cooperative Federalism .......... 131 
C. Delegating Medicaid Transformation .............................. 137 
IV. BEYOND ALLOCATION:  FEDERALISM’S BUREAUCRATIC LIFE . 139 
A. Regulatory Federalism as National-State Interaction .......... 140 
B. Three Examples of National-State Regulatory Interaction .... 141 
1. Occupational Safety and Health ............................... 141 
2. No Child Left Behind:  Administrative 
Implementation of Educational Policy ....................... 146 
3. Conditioned Participation/Unconditional Regulation:  
REAL ID Act ......................................................... 151 
V. THE SPENDING CLAUSE AND THE GHOST OF SEPARATION .... 153 
A. Spending Clause Jurisprudence:  The Ghost of Allocation ... 155 
1. Spending Clause Case Law ...................................... 155 
2. Coercion and the Tenth Amendment ......................... 160 
B. National Federation’s Missed Moment ......................... 161 
1. The Court’s Unsettling Middle Ground ..................... 162 
2. Context and Separation in the Joint Dissent ............... 165  
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE NORM OF ENGAGEMENT ...... 167 
A. Engagement in Administrative Law Doctrine .................... 169 
1. Speaking, Listening, and Responding:  Engagement 
and Agency Rulemaking ......................................... 170 
2. Weighing the Response:  Engagement and Arbitrary 
and Capricious Review ........................................... 172 
B. Federalism and Engagement in the Administrative State ..... 174 
1. Agencies as Sites of Federalism Decisionmaking ........... 174 
2. Substance and Procedure in Administrative 
Preemption ............................................................ 177 
C. Enforcing the Bureaucratic Spending Clause .................... 180 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 181 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2011 Term of the United States Supreme Court reached its 
climax on its final day.  The drama surrounding the Court’s most an-
ticipated ruling since Bush v. Gore1 was made all the more significant 
because it involved the signature legislation of a first-term President 
in the middle of a closely contested reelection campaign.  Unlike the 
 
 1 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,2 which 
gained in popular fame (or infamy) only after it was decided, the 
Court’s ruling on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“Obamacare” or “the ACA”)3 was the culmination of a very public 
march toward the Court, which began only hours after the historic 
legislation was signed.4  The decision was so anticipated that two lead-
ing news organizations announced the ruling incorrectly in an effort 
to be the first out of the gate.5  National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius6 marked a significant day in the Supreme Court’s as-
sessment of the national government’s substantive authority and its 
relationship with the states. 
Even close followers of the ACA litigation would be forgiven in 
thinking that the only issue to be decided was the fate of the Act’s In-
dividual Mandate provision.7  In both popular and scholarly commen-
tary, the Individual Mandate had become synonymous with the ACA.8  
 
 2 558 U.S. 50 (2010). 
 3 The earliest use of the term “Obamacare” seems to have been in late 2008 in an editorial 
written in the Washington Times.  See Editorial, Beware of ObamaCare, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 26, 
2008, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/26/beware-of-
obamacare/?page=1.  The term is a modification of the pejorative used to describe Hilla-
ry Clinton’s plan to reform health care, Hillarycare.  Kiran Moodley, ‘Obamacare’: More 
Than Just a Word,  THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 22, 2011, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2011/02/obamacare-more-than-just-a-word/71519/.  More recently the 
term appears to have been adopted by proponents of the ACA, including the President.  
Peter Baker, Democrats Embrace Once Pejorative ‘Obamacare’ Tag, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/04/health/policy/democrats-embrace-once-
pejorative-obamacare-tag.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. 
 4 The same day that President Obama signed the ACA into law, fourteen states filed suit 
challenging its constitutionality.  See 14 States File Suit to Block Health Care Law, CNN.COM 
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03-23/justice/health.care.lawsuit _ 1_
mccollum-health-care-individuals-buy-health-insurance?_s=PM:CRIME. 
 5 See Katherine Fung & Jack Mirkinson, Supreme Court Health Care Ruling:  CNN, Fox News 
Wrong on Individual Mandate, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2012, 3:52 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/28/cnn-supreme-court-health-care-individual-
mandate_n_1633950.html. 
 6 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB]. 
 7 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2006). 
 8 In a Wall Street Journal blog discussing the possible rulings of the Supreme Court, Medi-
caid was not mentioned in any of the four scenarios mentioned.  Peter Landers, Decisions, 
Decisions:  How High Court Could Rule on Health, WALL ST. J. BLOG (June 22, 2012, 11:42 
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/06/22/decisions-decisions-how-high-court-could-
rule-on-health/.  Health care scholars rightly paid more attention to the Medicaid issue 
than their constitutional law counterparts.  For example Nicole Huberfeld blogged about 
the Medicaid issues in the ACA litigation before the Court.  She recognized it as the “sur-
prise” issue on appeal, but declared that it might be the most decisive issue in the case.  
See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Landscape of the Amici Supporting Florida’s Medicaid Brief, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/
2012/01/landscape-of-the-amici-supporting-florida-medicaid-brief.html.  
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The only other question addressed by most commentators was the is-
sue of whether a finding of unconstitutionality would be severable 
from the remainder of the statute.9  Nevertheless, the ACA included 
other significant provisions in its pursuit of near-universal health care 
coverage—including the requirement that states expand their Medi-
caid-eligible populations.10  Though the Individual Mandate was often 
framed as the last great battle over the meaning of “Our Federal-
ism,”11 the Medicaid Expansion provision directly implicated the 
states in the plan to ensure health care for all.12 
The Medicaid Expansion provision requires states participating in 
the Medicaid program—all fifty states—to expand the eligibility for 
participation in Medicaid to those whose incomes are at or below 
133% of the poverty line.  The expansion would increase state Medi-
caid rolls by an average of 25%.13  Twenty-six states, led by the Florida 
Attorney General, challenged the expansion as unconstitutionally co-
ercive.  The Court’s invalidation of parts of the Medicaid Expansion 
provision was perhaps the biggest surprise of the otherwise unpre-
dictable decision.14  By invalidating the ACA’s grant of authority to 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold all of a 
state’s federal Medicaid reimbursement as a penalty for not expand-
ing Medicaid eligibility, the Roberts Court became the first court to 
hold a federal spending statute unconstitutionally coercive of state 
governments.15  The extent to which the Court has transformed the 
national-state relationship is unclear.16  What is clear is that the 
 
 9 Id. 
 10 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). 
 11 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971). 
 12 Strictly speaking, the individual mandate provision did not implicate the federal-state re-
lationship, in that it required individuals to purchase medical insurance directly, and did 
not obligate state governments to undertake any activity.  For a discussion of the failure of 
the challengers of the ACA to raise the individual liberty argument, see Jamal Greene’s 
article in this issue, Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 267 
(2012). 
 13 JOHN HOLAHAN & IRENE HEADEN, MEDICAID COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH 
REFORM:  NATIONAL AND STATE-BY-STATE RESULTS FOR ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL, at 
41 (2010). 
 14 Moreover, the two lower courts, each with reputations as conservative courts, rejected the 
states’ coercion claim.  See Florida ex rel. Biondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d, 648 F.2d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 15 National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2630 (2012) (“The Chief Jus-
tice therefore—for the first time ever—finds an exercise of Congress’ spending power un-
constitutionally coercive.”) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, 
and dissenting in part). 
 16 For discussion of the ramifications of the Court’s ruling, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Anti-Leveraging Principle in the Spending Clause after NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2128977. 
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Court’s position is a sharp break from past precedent, and calls into 
question the national-state relationship in the administration of one 
of the central pillars of cooperative federalism.17 
To understand the context of the Court’s ruling on Medicaid Ex-
pansion, it is necessary to recognize the ease with which a conserva-
tive district court judge dismissed the issue.  On January 31, 2011 the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida held 
that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s Individual 
Mandate provision exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, 
and did not qualify as a tax for purposes of Congress’s taxing authori-
ty.18  Judge Roger Vinson, a Reagan appointee, addressed both the 
state of Florida’s Commerce Clause and Spending Clause challenges 
to the ACA.19  The states argued that the ACA’s choice between ex-
panding eligibility for Medicaid or risking the loss of all federal Med-
icaid reimbursements was coercive.  The states based their claim on 
the coercion doctrine, to which the Supreme Court has alluded—
without much more—throughout its affirmation of congressionally-
imposed conditional spending requirements.20  The district court re-
jected Florida’s Spending Clause challenge.21 
The district court rejected the state’s argument that the states 
would be worse off financially because of the Medicaid Expansion 
provision, concluding that disputed issues remained regarding the 
extent to which the expansion would negatively affect state budgets.22  
 
 17 Cooperative federalism is a sharing of authority between the national government and 
the states.  It has played a significant role in environmental law, health care provision for 
the poor, among other important areas.  For a discussion of cooperative federalism, see 
Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 663 (2001).  The Spending Clause has played an important role in cooperative fed-
eralism, as it extends the ability of the national government to enlist the assistance of the 
states in implementing public policy.  See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 
1, 58 (2011). 
 18 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. 
Fla. 2011). 
 19 There was also a due process challenge to the ACA’s individual mandate requiring per-
sons to purchase health care insurance.  This claim is more global than the federalism-
based claims that primarily shaped Florida’s challenge in that it would have prohibited 
any government—state or national—from imposing a requirement to purchase such in-
surance.  Such an argument would certainly have raised the specter of Lochner v. New York.  
For a discussion of Lochner’s status as a problematic precedent, see Jamal Greene, The An-
ticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011). 
 20 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209–12 (1987); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. 
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585–93 (1937); see also West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 286–91 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 21 Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1266–70 (granting summary judgment to the government on 
the Medicaid Expansion issue). 
 22 Id. at 1267. 
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A holding on these grounds, however, would have required more liti-
gation between Florida and the national government as this would 
involve a factual dispute.23  However, the district court foreclosed any 
further litigation, by holding that Florida had no legal remedy for the 
ACA’s alleged coercion.  The court declared that “upon full consid-
eration of the relevant law and the Constitutional principles in-
volved . . . I must conclude that this claim cannot succeed and that 
the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”24  
Though Judge Vinson declared his sympathy for state governments, 
which he perceived as outmatched by the national government where 
the Spending Clause is concerned, he concluded that without some 
significant doctrinal transformation, “the states have little recourse to 
remaining the very junior partner in this partnership.”25 
Judge Vinson’s explanation of the law’s impotence in the ACA’s 
conditional funding provisions assigned blame to existing case law, 
which, he argued, had provided little elaboration of how conditions 
on the receipt of federal grants might undermine state integrity 
through coercive pressure.26  Judge Vinson was correct that the Su-
preme Court had up to that point failed to articulate a coherent con-
ception of coercion in spending clause controversies.27  Judge Vinson, 
and others, explained the doctrinal void as the Supreme Court’s fail-
ure to take the federalism revolution to its rightful conclusion as a 
mechanism for reining in congressional authority under the Spend-
ing Clause.28 
Criticism of the Rehnquist Court’s failure to develop the coercion 
doctrine appears warranted in the light of the “federalism revival” for 
 
 23 The district court’s ruling came on cross motions for summary judgment. 
 24 Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1269. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Vinson is hardly the first to question the efficacy of an anti-coercion principle in Spend-
ing Clause jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Understanding Constitutional Rights in 
a World of Optional Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989). 
 27 For a review of the criticisms of the coercion doctrine, see Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 
372–74. 
 28 See Lynn Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1914–15 
(1995) (arguing that the Court must rein in Congress’s Spending Clause authority in or-
der to fulfill the principles that underwrote Lopez); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, 
Conditional Spending:  Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 86–88 (1988) (criti-
cizing the Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Dole as not imposing sufficient constraints 
on Congress’s spending power); Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism:  The 
Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 464–73 
(2002) (arguing that “federal subsidization of states subvert key federalism values of di-
versity, vertical competition and horizontal competition”). 
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which the Court is properly recognized.29  The Rehnquist Court en-
forced constraints on national authority in several areas30—including 
limitations on Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause,31 
and increased constraints on Congress’s exercise of authority under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.32  The Court’s efforts 
during this era largely involved delineating the appropriate locus of 
particular regulatory activity, including determining that the national 
government’s regulation of “noneconomic activity” transcended its 
authority.33  Yet, during this period, indeed sometimes within the 
same case, the Court affirmed the broad scope of congressional au-
 
 29 Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole:  Why the Court Should Abandon Its 
Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 
460 (2003) (“The Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival advances a single core purpose:  
the reduction of national power.”).  Despite the Rehnquist Court’s reputation as having 
aggressively inserted itself into federalism disputes on the side of state governments, in 
reality the Court’s interventions in the name of federalism were not so uniform.  For ex-
ample, the Court maintained (or expanded) national preemption authority of state law, 
even in areas where conflicts between state and national law were less than clear.  With 
the exception of its articulation of the anti-commandeering doctrine, the Court failed to 
articulate any significant protections of states in cooperative aspects of national-state in-
teractions, including conditional funding and mandates on state governments.  See Ernest 
A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2004); Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 429 (2002). 
 30 See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER:  THE SUPREME COURT 
SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002) (noting the Rehnquist Court’s increased protections for 
state governments); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
(1995) (same); Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:  New 
York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71 (1998) (same); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism 
and the Uses and Limits of Law:  Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998) 
(same). 
 31 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating sections of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause power and Con-
gress’s remedial power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act as exceeding 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
 32 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (striking provisions of Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (striking provisions of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (striking the 
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  But see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding Ti-
tle II of the Americans with Disabilities Act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 33 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
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thority to establish its policy priorities through other means—
including the Spending Clause.34 
The Rehnquist Court’s reluctance to police the “interactive” as-
pects of the national-state relationship has been noted by federalism 
scholars.35  For example, Professor Bradford Clark has described judi-
cial federalism enforcement, saying, “[a]lthough judicial review in 
federalism cases invalidates statutes that exceed the outer bounds of 
federal power, it does nothing to constrain the exercise of power with-
in those bounds.”36  Clark’s description of federalism enforcement 
suggests two important things about the way we think about it:  the 
first is the dominance of allocation as the primary federalism en-
forcement mechanism, and the second is the focus on Congress as 
the primary subject of federalism enforcement.  Federalism enforce-
ment as allocation requires the ability to draw “clear” lines; doctrines 
such as “substantial effects” and “legislative commandeering” have 
been accepted as allowing for such analytical clarity. 
Framed as an allegation that Congress has exceeded its Spending 
Clause authority, coercion claims are understood as requiring the 
Court to allocate power.  Rather than viewing coercion claims as calls 
for the allocation, this Article reframes the coercion claim as a call for 
enforcement that does not rely on the allocation of power between 
the national government and the states.  Understood in this way, it 
ought to come as no surprise, then, that little popular or scholarly at-
tention has been paid to the challenge of the Medicaid Expansion 
despite the fact that a successful challenge would have significant im-
pact on the statute’s ability to meet the goals of near-universal insur-
ance coverage.37  The doctrinal void that underwrote the district 
court’s rejection of the states’ claim is more comprehensible if we 
understand the coercion doctrine as raising a different question than 
was addressed by the bulk of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism juris-
prudence. 
 
 34 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 35 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism, 80 TEX. L. REV. 327 (2001); see also JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM:  
HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 15–16 (2009) 
(“There will always be a role for the federal courts to play in refereeing the respective 
scope of state and federal authority.”). 
 36 Clark, supra note 35, at 341 (emphasis added). 
 37 Robert Pear, Court’s Ruling May Blunt Reach of the Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/health/policy/3-million-more-may-lack-
insurance-due-to-ruling-study-says.html; Stephanie Condon, States Opting Out of Medicaid 
Expansion Could Leave Many Uninsured, CBSNEWS.COM (July 2, 2012, 1:37 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57465110-503544/states-opting-out-of-
medicaid-expansion-could-leave-many-uninsured/. 
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Less explicit in Clark’s statement, but present, is that federalism 
enforcement need only pay attention to the phase where decisions 
about substantive power are actually made—generally at the enact-
ment stage in the national legislature.38  To that extent, Spending 
Clause jurisprudence has been primarily dominated by conceptions 
of notice.39  Federalism problems are legislative problems, and must 
be handled as such.  There is little or no attention paid to how feder-
alism problems develop in the implementation of a specific policy or 
program. 
The Court and the vast majority of the scholarly community have 
truncated the life of American federalism and its enforcement by 
their focus on the initial exercise of authority as the only site of fed-
eralism enforcement.  This Article argues that federalism enforce-
ment should also be understood as regulating national and state in-
teraction that occurs in the policy-implementation stages of 
governance.  This argument is based on the fact that significant as-
pects of the national-state relationship take place after substantive 
regulatory authority has been “allocated” at the enactment stage.  In-
teraction between the national government and the states does not 
cease when it is determined that the national government possesses 
the authority to regulate in a particular area.  Moreover, broad inter-
pretations of the Spending Clause power allow Congress to exceed 
even enumerated limits on substantive authority, thereby allowing for 
continued interactions where substantive regulatory authority may 
not exist.  For opponents of the ACA, and broad spending authority, 
the solution is to impose limits on Congress’s exercise of it.  By con-
trast, this Article contends that federalism enforcement’s capacity 
 
 38 This does not suggest that questions of the possession of power do not take place at the 
administrative level.  As anyone paying attention to the preemption debates over the last 
few years recognizes, the fight has been about whether agencies are appropriate sites to 
make decisions about the possession of substantive regulatory authority.  The Court in 
addressing these questions has not offered a definitive answer to this question, but it has 
been noted that the Court has gone out of its way to hold that Congress, rather than a 
particular administrative agency, has made the preemption decision.  See, e.g., Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding that the Medical Device Amendments 
preempted state tort regimes); Watters v. Wachovia, 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (holding that the 
National Bank Act preempted state regulation of subsidiaries of national banks); see also 
Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008) 
[hereinafter Metzger, New Federalism] (arguing that the Supreme Court avoided making 
decisions about agency authority to make preemption decisions in early cases). 
 39 See Bagenstos, supra note 16 (discussing the predominance of clear statement rules in 
Spending Clause litigation); Brian Galle, Getting Spending:  How to Replace Clear Statement 
Rules with Clear Thinking about Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155 
(2004) (same). 
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must be expanded to include the interactive dimensions of the policy-
implementation stage of national-state relations. 
The recognition of the opportunity for an expanded conception 
of federalism enforcement is dependent upon understanding the 
practice of national-state interactions in the real world.  Legal schol-
ars, and others, have provided important descriptions of the interac-
tions between states and the national government in contextualized 
accounts of the ways in which states and the national government en-
gage in forms of “negotiation” and contestation in the development 
of policy objectives.40  One of the most significant aspects of their 
work is its demonstration of the intertemporal and multi-institutional 
dimension of policy implementation.  That is, their work allows us to 
see state and national interaction that is more complicated than ap-
pears to be the case when thinking solely about federalism enforce-
ment as limited to the constraints on Congress.  These descriptions 
demonstrate national and state dynamics as involving a series of in-
teractions over time, rather than our depiction of them as solely in-
volving a single dispute at a particular moment in time.  Seeing inter-
actions as bundled and intertemporal, rather than as merely one-off 
transactions, confirms that the states and the national government 
rarely enter into any particular conflict as actors bearing no history of 
past interactions or future interactions.41  This means that interac-
tions take into account more than merely the immediate issue, but 
take into account past and (more importantly) future interactions.42  
The central ambition of this Article, then, is to draw from these 
“thick” descriptions to offer a corrective to our current thinking 
about federalism enforcement in areas of state and national interac-
 
 40 NUGENT, supra note 35; Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federal-
ism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 17. 
 41 The insight that states and the national government behave in strategic ways in their in-
teractions with one another, has been formalized by the introduction of game theoretic 
approaches to the federalism literature.  See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Dole’s Future: A Strategic 
Analysis, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 165 (2008); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local 
Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation:  Toward a Public–Choice Explanation of Feder-
alism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 274–90 (1990). 
 42 Daryl Levinson has described interactions between states and the national government, 
saying:  “Where the longer-term gains from cooperation are high enough . . . the terms of 
cooperation are clear, and the game continues indefinitely, a cooperative equilibrium 
may be sustained if each actor adopts a tit-for-tat or similar reciprocal strategy and thus 
conditions its own compliance on compliance by others.”  Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment 
and Politics:  The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 685 
(2011).  Levinson’s argument appears to suggest that interactions of this type might be 
enforced by the parties themselves.  As will be demonstrated below, though Levinson’s 
description might accurately describe the administrative process of policymaking, we have 
not concluded that this process requires no external enforcement. 
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tion that move beyond our enslavement to allocating congressional 
authority as its exclusive mechanism. 
Unfortunately, the intertemporal, bundled interactions were ef-
fectively ignored in the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Medicaid 
Expansion provision.  Both the majority and the dissent framed the 
issue in terms that were institutionally and temporally truncated:  one 
side acted as if 1965 were the only significant date in the life of the 
Medicaid program, while the other side acted as though 2010 were 
the only significant date in the program, as though nothing had 
come before.43  From an institutional perspective, they ignored the 
fact that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (“CMS”) in the De-
partment of Health and Human Services is the most important insti-
tution in Medicaid federalism, both because of its role in the devel-
opment of state Medicaid plans, and because of the significance of 
the waiver process in the interaction between states and the national 
government in the Medicaid program.44  Missing from all of the Med-
icaid rulings was any discussion of the bureaucratic dimension of 
Medicaid policy implementation.  Each of the opinions resorted to 
drawing lines and separating state from national authority as the most 
effective mechanism for enforcing federalism. 
That the Court would resort to line-drawing in the context of the 
challenge to Medicaid expansion is not surprising, given the coercion 
claims’ roots in the Tenth Amendment.45  Nowhere is line-drawing 
more apparent than in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.  Through-
out the history of judicial enforcement of the Tenth Amendment, 
courts and commentators have understood the Tenth Amendment as 
protecting substantive authority at the state level—whether this is un-
derstood as authority over particular subject matters or authority over 
particular state institutions.  The coercion challenge to the ACA’s 
Medicaid Expansion provision forces us to squarely confront the 
Tenth Amendment.  The conceptual dominance of allocation and 
separation in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence makes it an utterly 
ineffective tool when addressing issues of national and state interac-
tion, where the issues involve more than a conflict about the posses-
 
 43 For a discussion of the transformation of the Medicaid program in the period between its 
enactment and the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion, see discussion, infra at Parts III.B. and C.  
For a discussion of the way this has affected the Court’s decision in National Federation, see 
infra at Parts V.A.2 to V.B.1–2. 
 44 For a discussion of the administrative dimension of Medicaid, see Jonathan R. Bolton, The 
Case of the Disappearing Statute:  A Legal and Policy Critique of the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to 
Restructure the Medicaid Program, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91 (2003) (criticizing the 
discretion that administrative officials receive in the waiver process). 
 45 Chas C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
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sion of substantive authority.  Before we abdicate all possibility of fed-
eralism enforcement in this area, we might examine other operation-
al paradigms for the Tenth Amendment, drawn from the life of fed-
eralism inside the administrative state. 
This Article turns to administrative agencies as a site of federal-
ism’s “life” as a corrective to our obsession with the legislative process 
as the object of federalism enforcement.  Paying attention to the im-
plementation of policy reveals dimensions of the national-state rela-
tionship in cooperative federalism that we might miss in focusing 
solely on the enactment stage.  That is, the practice of power might 
work very differently than is supposed by an abstract conception 
drawn from legislation.46  Attention to administrative agencies as the 
site of federalism practice yields significant insights.  It reveals admin-
istrative law as a model and source of norms that are capable of reor-
ienting Tenth Amendment jurisprudence from the conceptual dom-
inance of allocation and separation.47  Underlying administrative law 
doctrines that effectuate the participation in notice and comment 
rulemaking and that maximize rational decisionmaking in agency 
policy choice is a commitment to the norm of engagement.  En-
gagement (as against separation), understood as a behavioral norm, 
 
 46 In recognizing the different valence of power relations, however, I do not reach the same 
conclusions as Nugent or Bulman-Pozen and Gerken in that the availability of judicial re-
view, and the type of remedy necessary resists a normative commitment to “self-help” as a 
global solution to federalism enforcement.  Along with scholars like Ryan, the discussion 
below suggests that judicial review might be warranted in some cases, and not in others.  
However, unlike Ryan, who takes substantive allocations of power as her starting point, 
this analysis resists this starting point.  The resistance arises from a commitment to what I 
have termed in other projects as the “relational” dimension of the national-state relation-
ship, which suggests that the states and the national government owe a duty to one an-
other, even where we are clear about the possession of substantive authority.  For recent 
discussions of this, see Charlton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court:  Judicial Federalism 
Through a Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 524–43 (2011) [hereinafter 
Copeland, Federal Law in State Court]; Charlton C. Copeland, Ex parte Young:  Sovereignty, 
Immunity and the Constitutional Structure of American Federalism, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 843, 849–
56 (2009) [hereinafter Copeland, Ex Parte Young].  For other relational conceptions of 
American federalism, see Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility:  The Political Mo-
rality of Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 734 (2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Feder-
alism:  Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experiences, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 283–86 
(2001). 
 47 The argument presented here is different from other arguments that have relied on ad-
ministrative law doctrine to protect state interests.  Though these discussions certainly pay 
closer attention to the policy implementation stage of the national-state relationship, they 
offer administrative law as an additional layer of protection for state interests.  This Arti-
cle’s central argument goes a bit further than this by asserting that not only might we un-
derstand federalism concerns as having been transported into administrative law doc-
trine, but that we might reorient federalism doctrine through the prism of administrative 
law doctrine. 
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may offer guidance for reconsidering federalism regulation in spaces 
of shared policy implementation.48  This Article serves as a starting 
point for this conversation, and does not develop the doctrinal pro-
nouncements or tests that such a norm might call for.  It is, however, 
an important first step in rethinking federalism enforcement. 
Part I of this Article discusses the role of the Tenth Amendment 
in federalism enforcement.  It demonstrates both the transformation 
and stability in the Court’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.  The 
subject matter of the Tenth Amendment’s protection has changed 
from substantive state authority to state political institutions as the 
embodiment of federalism enforcement.  Nevertheless, the Tenth 
Amendment continues to be deployed to enforce separation of the 
protected subject matter from entanglement with the national gov-
ernment. 
Part II of the Article provides an overview and critique of the po-
litical safeguards model, which rejected judicial review of federalism 
based on the structural protections for state governments in the na-
tional political institutions.  Much of the political safeguards model is 
premised upon a conception of federalism enforcement as power al-
location.  This Part argues that the political safeguards model con-
ceives of national-state interaction as taking place exclusively in the 
Congress, and only at the time of initial enactment.  Such an under-
standing is an incomplete description of federalism. 
Part III provides a history and description of the Medicaid pro-
gram and its development.  It also addresses the process by which the 
national government and the states make Medicaid policy through 
waiver.  The main objective of this Part is to demonstrate that the 
multi-institutional and intertemporal dimension of the Medicaid 
program conflicts with the dominance of the separation of the Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and the truncation of the dominant 
models of federalism enforcement. 
Part IV discusses the Supreme Court’s opinion in National Federa-
tion.49  This Part demonstrates the ways in which the three Medicaid 
Expansion opinions all resort to the dominant framework of separa-
tion and truncation of the Medicaid program.  This Part also ad-
dresses the dominant frameworks for thinking about the Spending 
Clause and coercion. 
 
 48 Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance:  The Changing Nature of Mod-
ern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 23–29 (2007). 
 49 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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Part V of this Article demonstrates the practice of national-state 
interaction.  However, the primary purpose of this Part is to demon-
strate the institutionally and temporally dynamic quality of American 
federalism.  Against the dominant conception of federalism on dis-
play in the political safeguards model, which appears to understand 
federalism as the initial demarcation of substantive regulatory author-
ity that takes place when legislation is enacted, Part V broadens our 
institutional and temporal dimension of national-state interaction.  
By focusing on three different cooperative federalism programs—the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act; the No Child Left Behind Act; 
and the REAL ID Act50—this Part demonstrates that allocation of sub-
stantive authority does not correctly explain what takes place between 
the national government and the states under these circumstances.51 
To the extent that federalism dynamics largely take place in ad-
ministrative settings, Part VI argues that administrative law doctrine 
provides an alternative model for Tenth Amendment jurisprudence 
beyond separatism.52  One of the central norms imposed in adminis-
trative law is the norm of engagement; both substantive and proce-
dural administrative law doctrine work to protect constitutional val-
 
 50 Both NCLBA and the REAL ID Act have been insightfully addressed by Jessica Bulman-
Pozen and Heather Gerken.  In fact, my inspiration for discussing them is, in part, be-
cause of the differences I highlight.  Rather than addressing these statutes from the stage 
of state-level rebellion or critique, the discussion that follows attempts to demonstrate the 
ways the temporally-extended dimension of these relationships affects the extent to which 
outright rebellion or challenge is the sole policy response.  Further, to the extent that 
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken argue that the availability of state-level criticism of cooperative 
federalism policy justifies the elimination of judicial enforcement as a general matter, I 
part company with them in seeing this as a more micro-level decision that depends upon 
context, as will be discussed further. 
 51 This is not to suggest that the national government and states are not involved in contest-
ing some aspects of sovereign authority; however, as I hope to demonstrate, the conflicts 
between the states and the national government are better understood as involving what 
federalism scholar Erin Ryan calls a “tug-of-war.”  See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of 
War Within:  Seeking Checks and Balances in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 
503, 629 (2007) [hereinafter Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within]. 
 52 Unlike other scholarly discussions of administrative federalism, this Article does not sug-
gest that agencies are more appropriate sites of federalism decisionmaking.  For an in-
sightful defense of agencies’ role in federalism decisionmaking, see Brian Galle & Mark 
Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism:  Preemption, Delegation and Agencies at the Edge of 
Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008).  Rather, this Article seeks to explore the role that 
administrative law doctrine—or at least some subset of administrative law doctrine—
procedural rules—might be beneficial in reorienting federalism enforcement within even 
the judiciary.  That is, this Article does not seek to challenge, and indeed seeks to bolster, 
the judicial role in federalism enforcement by augmenting the judiciary’s toolkit in par-
ticular federalism disputes. 
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ues by imposing the norm of engagement.53  This Part demonstrates 
the significance of the engagement of underlying disputes over the 
place of federalism in agency decisionmaking by focusing on the ju-
dicial review of agency decisions to preempt state law.  The Court’s 
decision in Wyeth v. Levine54 represents the way in which the judiciary 
can protect federalism values in the policy-implementation stage in 
ways by forcing agency engagement.55 
I. FEDERALISM AS JURISDICTIONAL SEPARATION 
Separation has played a dominant role in conceptualizing federal-
ism in American political and legal history.  Federalism, understood 
as the separation of substantive authority of the state and national 
government, provides the recipe for the protection of state authority 
as a constitutional commitment.  The separatist dimension of federal-
ism enforcement exists in both the political and legal debates about 
cooperative federalism.  Presidents and congressional representatives 
have argued against expansive interpretations of Congress’s spending 
authority on the grounds that it would eradicate the jurisdictional 
separation of states from the national government.  Jurisprudentially, 
the Tenth Amendment has been deployed in an effort to protect the 
separate spheres of state and national jurisdiction, whether under-
 
 53 There has been a bourgeoning literature on administrative constitutionalism in the last 
two years, which has informed my understanding of the area.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:  THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
(2010) (arguing that the implementation of constitutional norms largely takes place in 
the administrative state and involves statutory enforcement); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary 
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010) [herein-
after Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law]. 
 54 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 55 Leading scholars of federalism and administrative law have argued that federalism en-
forcement might be better approached as a species of administrative law.  See, e.g., Metz-
ger, New Federalism, supra note 38, at 2087, 2091 (“[F]or federalism to have continued vi-
brancy as a governing principle, it needs to be ‘normalized’ and consciously incorporated 
into the day-to-day functioning of the federal administrative state.”).  This Article might 
be understood as reversing Metzger’s attempt to collapse federalism enforcement into 
the administrative process.  Though my argument has learned a great deal from Metz-
ger’s insights, its central claim is that administrative process—more precisely its norma-
tive underpinnings—might perform a more useful contribution to federalism enforce-
ment if we attempted to translate them into the framework of federalism enforcement.  
Federalism enforcement in this understanding maintains an important role in constitu-
tional meaning, but is enhanced by the introduction of a framework that starts with dif-
ferent premises than traditional conceptions of separation.  In this respect it avoids the 
criticism that has been leveled at Metzger’s project as undervaluing federalism as a consti-
tutional norm.  See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down:  
Administrative Federalism without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111 (2008) (responding to a num-
ber of federalism articles, including one by Metzger). 
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stood as subject matter, core state functions, or core state institutions.  
In each domain separation is understood as the mechanism by which 
federalism commitments are enforced. 
A. Federalism’s Politics:  Allocation in the Debate Over National Authority 
The political debates over the scope of the national spending 
power preceded the jurisprudential debates by a century.  At the ear-
liest, members of the Founding generation articulated opposing posi-
tions on the ends to which the national government could expend its 
treasure.  These debates take two forms that shaped the debate’s de-
velopment in the nineteenth century.  The first dimension of the de-
bate was about the relationship of the spending power to other con-
stitutionally-enumerated powers—including the taxing and 
commerce authorities.  The second dimension of the debate was 
primarily concerned with the implications of broad interpretations of 
the national spending authority.  Each dimension emphasizes the 
separation of state from national authority. 
1. Debating the Spending Power in Early America 
Conventional wisdom assumes that cooperative federalism arose 
from the constitutional transformations brought on by the New Deal 
revolution.56  However, debates about early forms of cooperative fed-
eralism date back to the first decades of American history.57  The sin-
gle most important factor in cooperative federal arrangements is the 
national government’s access to substantial revenue streams and the 
breadth of expenditures to which these resources can be put.  As 
such, the scope of congressional taxing and spending authority is 
central to the debate about the constitutionality over cooperative 
federalism.  Even before national spending authority could be de-
ployed in expansive ways, its exercise had to overcome arguments 
that it was limited to only those areas within Congress’s designated 
substantive authority.  Maintaining a government of limited power 
meant constraining the Spending Clause power lest national power 
run amok. 
Alexander Hamilton set the stage for debate about the scope of 
congressional authority by calling for acceptance of a broad interpre-
 
 56 For a discussion of the longer history of the “new federalism,” see KIMBERLEY S. JOHNSON, 
GOVERNING THE AMERICAN STATE:  CONGRESS AND THE NEW FEDERALISM, 1877–1929 
(2006). 
 57 See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP:  INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-
OPERATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1962). 
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tation of the national spending power.  Rather than reading the 
spending authority as connected to the constrained Commerce 
Clause authority, Hamilton connected it to the broader power to 
raise money.  Hamilton argued:  “[T]he power to raise money is ple-
nary and indefinite; and the objects to which it may be appropriated 
are no less comprehensive.”58  Regarding the scope of the “general 
welfare,” Hamilton espoused a similarly broad construction, declar-
ing:  “The terms ‘general welfare’ were doubtless intended to signify 
more than was expressed or imported in those which Preced-
ed[.] . . . The phrase is as comprehensive as any that could be used; 
because it was not fit that the constitutional authority of the Un-
ion . . . [and] should not be restricted within narrower limits than the 
“general welfare.”59  Hamilton admitted that the only significant limi-
tation regarding the scope of Congress’s appropriation authority was 
that “the object to which an appropriation of money is to be made be 
General and not local.”60 
It ought to come as no surprise that Hamilton’s interpretation did 
not engender unanimity even among the Founding Generation, as 
demonstrated by James Madison’s narrow interpretation of the 
spending authority during his presidency.  In a message explaining 
his veto of the Federal Improvement Plan of 1817, Madison argued 
that national taxing and spending authority were limited to those 
subjects that fell within Congress’s enumerated powers.61  Madison 
argued that interpreting the constitutional provision “to provide for 
common defense and general welfare,” without limitation, would 
render the attempt to enumerate (and thereby limit) congressional 
authority a nullity.  He further argued that an interpretation of the 
clause sufficient to legitimize the Act would “have the effect of giving 
to Congress a general power of legislation, instead of the defined and 
limited one hitherto understood to belong to them . . . .”62  Finally, 
Madison argued that to accept the legitimacy of congressional au-
thority would be to undermine the Constitution’s status as supreme 
law, because federal statutes enacted under the taxing and spending 
 
 58 “Report on the Subject of Manufacturers,” in 1 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 231. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 233. 
 61 The legislation subsidized the construction and operation of higher education for stu-
dents of agriculture and mechanics.  See WILLIAM JAMES HULL HOFFER, TO ENLARGE THE 
MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT:  CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES AND THE GROWTH OF THE 
AMERICAN STATE, 1858–1891, at 15 (2007). 
 62 James Madison, Veto of Federal Public Works Bill, CONSTITUTION.ORG (Mar. 3, 1817), availa-
ble at http://www.constitution.org/jm/18170303_veto.htm. 
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authority would not be “susceptible of judicial cognizance or deci-
sion.”63 
The spending power’s scope generated debate well beyond the 
Founding generation.  It carried over into debates about some of the 
most important pieces of legislation in American history, including 
the initial attempts to enact the Morrill Land Grant in 1858.64  The 
legislation empowered the national government to donate federal 
land to state governments on the condition that states use the pro-
ceeds from the land sales to establish institutions of higher learning 
to teach “agricultural and mechanical studies,” among other areas.65  
Unlike earlier grants to state governments, these grants imposed both 
restrictions as to the use of sale proceeds and instituted national over-
sight of state governments.  For example, the states were required to 
report to the national government with respect to their progress and 
costs of development. 
Though the Land Grant legislation passed both Houses of Con-
gress, it was vetoed by President James Buchanan.  In one of the most 
extended discussions by a President regarding conditional grant legis-
lation, President Buchanan explained his veto as based on the Land 
Grant bill’s unconstitutionality.66  Buchanan argued that Congress was 
without power to donate public lands to the states for the purpose of 
establishing institutions of higher learning.  Buchanan’s argument 
borrowed largely from Madison’s argument of forty years prior that 
the taxing and spending authority was limited to only those areas that 
fall within the enumerated powers, or are “necessary and proper” for 
the achievement of any of those powers.67  As the provision of educa-
tion, according to Buchanan, did not fall within an explicitly-granted 
congressional power, the appropriation of national funds for state 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 For a history of the debates over the Morrill Land Grant legislation, see HOFFER, supra 
note 61, at 24–31. 
 65 The Land Grant legislation did not represent the first time that the nation’s resources 
had been distributed to state governments.  The first national grants to state governments 
included the distribution of federal lands to state governments, the sale of which was in-
tended for the purpose of financing educational institutions, canals, roads, and other im-
provements.  National aid to states continued in the form of an outright distribution of 
the national treasury’s $28 million surplus to the state governments.  These early grants to 
state governments were marked by minimal conditions and oversight.  JANE PERRY CLARK, 
THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM:  FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
139–43 (1938). 
 66 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 1412–13 (1859). 
 67 See Edward S. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress—Apropos the Maternity Act, 36 HARV. L. 
REV. 548, 568–72 (1923). 
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governments contravened the constitutionally legitimate scope of 
Congress’s power.68 
The Court did not directly address the issue of the scope of the 
General Welfare Clause until the New Deal era.  In its decision in 
United States v. Butler,69 the Court cast its vote with Hamilton.  Though 
the Court did not think it necessary to “review the writings of public 
men and commentators or discuss the legislative practice”70 without 
any analysis, they concluded that Hamilton had the better of the ar-
guments.  They concluded that Congress’s taxing authority, while not 
unlimited, was not limited by the Constitution’s constraints on Con-
gress’s legislative powers.71  Likewise, the Court concluded that the 
corresponding appropriations power was “not limited by the direct 
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”72 
2. Debating Early Cooperative Federalism:  Protecting State Separation 
The separation of state authority from national authority was con-
sidered a primary mechanism of enforcing the Constitution’s federal 
structure in debates about cooperative federalism programs.  
Throughout the nineteenth century, opponents of cooperative feder-
alism programs emphasized the extent to which such programs would 
undermine state sovereignty by threatening their separate existence. 
Again, President Buchanan explained his veto of the Land Grant 
legislation by emphasizing the importance of the separation of state 
and national authority.  He argued that the donation of national 
lands to state governments was unconstitutional because it would 
“break down the barriers which have been so carefully constructed in 
the Constitution to separate Federal from State authority.”73  Further 
he argued that recognizing such authority in the national govern-
ment “would be an actual consolidation of the Federal and State 
Governments, so far as the great taxing and money power is con-
cerned, and constitute a sort of partnership between the two in the 
Treasury of the United States, equally ruinous to both.”74 
 
 68 With the post-secession Congress emptied of the most ardent opponents of Morrill Land 
Grant legislation and broad interpretations of Congress’ spending power, the land grant 
legislation was enacted in 1862. 
 69 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 70 Id. at 66. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 1413 (1859). 
 74 Id. 
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The constitutional requirement of separation was advanced by 
congressional leaders as well.  Representative William Cobb of Ala-
bama opposed the land grant legislation because it threatened state 
independence.  Arguing against the bill, Cobb declared:  “The pat-
ronage would be fatal to the independence of the States; with pat-
ronage comes the power to control . . . .”75  Virginia Senator James M. 
Mason argued that the act amounted to “an unconstitutional robbing 
of the Treasury for the purpose of bribing the States.”76  He further 
argued that the long-term consequences of the states’ acceptance of 
the bribe would be that, “[i]n a very short time the whole agricultural 
interests of the country will be taken out of the hands of the States 
and subject to the action of Congress . . . .”77  Though the debate 
about the scope of the national government’s authority under the 
spending clause was largely a debate between the political branches 
of the national government throughout the nineteenth century, the 
separatist paradigm carried over when the Court entered the debate 
in the twentieth century. 
B. Power Allocation in Twentieth Century Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Tenth Amendment jurisprudence of the early twentieth cen-
tury sought to protect state autonomy by strictly defining state sub-
stantive power and separating it from national authority.  In Hammer 
v. Dagenhart,78 the Court invalidated the Keating-Owen Act of 1916 
(the Child Labor Act), which prohibited the interstate sale of goods 
manufactured using child labor.  The Court held that Congress’s au-
thority to regulate interstate commerce did not extend to establishing 
minimum ages of employees used in the manufacturing process.  The 
Court separated the labor involved in the production and manufac-
ture of goods in interstate commerce from Congress’s authority to 
regulate the transportation of goods in interstate commerce.79  That 
is, the labor used to manufacture an otherwise acceptable good in in-
terstate commerce was separate from the good produced.  In addi-
tion to this narrow interpretation of Congress’s Commerce Clause au-
thority, the Court held that recognizing national authority to regulate 
child labor would “destroy the local power”80 in violation of the Tenth 
 
 75 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1741 (1858). 
 76 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 718 (1859). 
 77 Id. 
 78 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 79 Id. at 273–74. 
 80 Id. at 274. 
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Amendment.  The centrality of the state’s possession of substantive 
power is exemplified in the Court’s declaration, “[t]he maintenance 
of the authority of the states over matters purely local is as essential to 
the preservation of our institutions as is the conservation of the su-
premacy of the federal power in all matters entrusted to the Nation 
by the Federal Constitution.”81  The effective enforcement of the 
Constitution’s federal structure depended upon the recognition of 
dual sovereignties through the strict separation of state and national 
substantive authority.82  The protection of federalism through the 
preservation of jurisdictional space marked the era of dual federal-
ism. 
Through the early New Deal period the Court invalidated national 
legislation based on its conclusion that congressional regulation 
trampled on a “purely local” power to be exercised by the states.  In 
United States v. Butler,83 about which more will be said below, the Court 
held that the Agriculture Adjustment Act, which attempted to shore 
up agriculture prices by paying farmers to reduce their agricultural 
production, violated the Constitution.  Despite the Court’s affirma-
tion of Congress’s authority to spend beyond the scope of its enu-
merated power, the Court invalidated the Act on the ground that 
Congress had sought to regulate activities that were within the realm 
of state jurisdiction.  The Butler Court concluded that the purpose of 
the Act was to regulate agricultural output, an activity that the Court 
defined as “a purely local activity.”84  Throughout the opinion, the 
Court reiterated that the United States government was a “dual form 
of government,” the protection of which required the separation of 
the sovereignty of both the national and state governments as the 
embodiment of federalism enforcement. 
C. Identifying Sovereignty’s Core:  Allocation in the Post-New Deal Era 
1. Protecting Fundamental State Power 
The Court’s enforcement of the Tenth Amendment lay dormant 
for nearly four decades.  The period from 1937 to 1976 saw the na-
tional government expand its regulatory reach to solve problems of 
 
 81 Id. at 275. 
 82 For a classic discussion of the era, see Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 
VA. L. REV. 1 (1950). 
 83 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 84 Id. at 64. 
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environmental degradation,85 workplace safety,86 and educational 
preparedness.87  For many, it appeared that the constitutional protec-
tions for federalism were dead letter.88  To the surprise of many 
commentators, the Court asserted itself, and the Tenth Amendment, 
as the protectors of state sovereignty in National League of Cities v. Us-
ery.89  Though some identified this as an attempt to return to the “du-
al federalism” of the past, the scope of the Tenth Amendment’s pro-
tection was significantly reduced from its heyday.  However, the Court 
remained committed to separation and allocation as the primary mo-
tifs in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. 
In National League of Cities the Court held that amendments to the 
Federal Labor Standards Act, which extended minimum wage protec-
tion to state and local government employees, violated the Tenth 
Amendment.90  The Court rested its conclusion on the Constitution’s 
federal structure, which required the protection of the “separate and 
independent existence” of state governments.91  The Court based its 
decision on the conclusion that the protection of the federal struc-
ture would be achieved by the separation and protection of the “es-
sential” functions of state sovereignty.92  Like the early twentieth cen-
tury Court, the National League of Cities Court held that the “power to 
determine the wages . . . paid to those whom they employ”93 was an 
essential attribute of state sovereignty.  So serious was the incursion 
on the states’ domain, the Court reasoned, that “[i]f Congress may 
withdraw from the States the authority to make those fundamental 
employment decisions . . . we think there would be little left of the 
States’ separate and independent existence.”94 
The National League of Cities Court did not rely on older concep-
tions of “local power” in its invalidation of the minimum wage stat-
utes, as had earlier Courts.  Indeed, the Court seemed to accept an 
expansive interpretation of the national government’s authority un-
der the Commerce Clause.95  Nevertheless, the Court, like its prede-
 
 85 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
 86 See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006). 
 87 See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). 
 88 See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 
(1985) (highlighting that National League of Cities was the first case in forty years to over-
turn a congressional statute on federalism grounds). 
 89 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 90  426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 91 Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 95 Id. at 840. 
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cessor, concluded that the correct method of protecting the Tenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of the state governments’ “ability to func-
tion effectively”96 lay in the separation of state hiring activities from 
other hiring activities to be regulated.  Though the Court did not rely 
on the Tenth Amendment to interpose state authority between the 
national government and private citizens, it identified state hiring 
practices as a paradigmatic embodiment of the state’s sovereign will.97  
The protection of this will required its separation from interference 
by national political actors. 
The focus on traditional state functions continued to animate 
even unsuccessful challenges to alleged expansive interpretations of 
national authority.  In her dissent in Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion v. Mississippi (“FERC”),98 Justice O’Connor also identified the 
Tenth Amendment as a restraint on congressional action that “would 
impair a state’s ability to function as a state.”99  In FERC, O’Connor 
concluded that Congress’s requirement that state public utility com-
missions consider federally-determined standards would undermine 
state integrity on the basis that the requirement affected “traditional 
functions of the State,” into whose category she included the regula-
tion of public utilities.100  O’Connor’s dissent marked the path that 
the Court’s protection of state interests would take over the next dec-
ade. 
2. Protecting Fundamental State Institutions 
The Court’s depiction of the Tenth Amendment as protective of 
substantive state power expanded to include the protection of state 
institutions from national interference or commandeering.  The de-
bate over the scope of national authority to enlist state institutions in 
the implementation of national law preceded National League of Cities 
in the lower federal courts,101 and this issue was raised by Justice 
O’Connor in dissent in FERC.  It would lay the foundation for the 
 
 96 Id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). 
 97 One might reasonably argue that the state challenges to the Individual Mandate are a 
version of interposition of state authority between the national government and private 
citizens. 
 98 456 U.S. 742 (1981) [hereinafter FERC]. 
 99 Id. at 778 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
100 Id. at 753. 
101 See, e.g., Brown v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 
(1977), remanded to 566 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1977) (examining the tension between the 
commerce power and state power). 
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Court’s revitalization of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence for the 
first time since its reappearance in National League of Cities. 
In addition to her depiction of the Tenth Amendment as protect-
ing substantive state authority, Justice O’Connor’s dissent in FERC al-
so depicted the Tenth Amendment as protective of state institutions.  
O’Connor concluded that Congress’s requirement that state public 
utility commissions consider adoption of federal standards regulating 
gas and electric utilities constituted a commandeering of state institu-
tions.  O’Connor declared:  “State legislative and administrative bod-
ies are not field offices of the national bureaucracy.”102  She wrote:  
“The power to make decisions and set policy, however, embraces 
more than the ultimate authority to enact laws; it also includes the 
power to decide which proposals are most worthy of considera-
tion. . . . the [Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (“PURPA”)] choos-
es twelve proposals, forcing their consideration even if the state agen-
cy deems other ideas more worthy of immediate attention.”103  
O’Connor rejected the majority’s conclusion that the statute’s forced 
consideration of federal policies was less intrusive than outright 
preemption on two grounds—resource allocation and political ac-
countability.  Regarding resource allocation, O’Connor noted that 
preemption, though silencing the state as a norm articulator, did not 
divert a state’s decision-making process by forcing it to undertake the 
consideration of national goals, rather than its own priorities.104  
O’Connor wrote:  “The States might well prefer that Congress simply 
impose the standards described in PURPA; this, at least, would leave 
them free to exercise their power in other areas.”105  For O’Connor, 
the eviction of states from policy domains through preemption repre-
sented an advance over their subordination by the national govern-
ment when entangled in cooperative governance structures that im-
posed constraints on the freedom of their decisionmaking. 
O’Connor’s resource-allocation argument against the imposition 
of a PURPA’s consideration requirement did not convince a majority 
of the Court.  But her FERC dissent also rehearsed the argument that 
“[c]ongressional compulsion . . . blurs the lines of political accounta-
 
102 FERC, 456 U.S. at 777 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
103 Id. at 779. 
104 Justice O’Connor’s argument had been stated earlier by Richard B. Stewart.  Richard B. 
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?  Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of Na-
tional Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1231–32 (1977) (arguing that mandating 
state implantation of national policy undermines that state’s ability to determine “what 
goods and services state and local governments should provide their citizens and how 
these measures should be financed”).  But see Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 40. 
105 FERC, 456 U.S. at 787 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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bility and leaves citizens feeling that their representatives are no 
longer responsive to local needs,”106 which would meet with greater 
success in New York v. United States.107  There, O’Connor reiterated her 
attack on legislative commandeering, arguing that residents choose 
state officers who share their policy views.  If these policy views are 
anathema to the national norms, they may be preempted, but such 
preemption of state policy is attributable by state residents to the pol-
icy choice of nationally-elected leaders.  Legislative commandeering, 
however, forced “state officials [to] bear the brunt of public disap-
proval [of a particular policy choice], while the federal officials who 
devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the elec-
toral ramifications of their decision.”108  Thus, the effective protection 
of the state’s independence in the federal system, and values of polit-
ical accountability, required immunizing state legislative bodies from 
national commands. 
The necessity of separation was emphasized even more in the 
Court’s decision in Printz v. United States,109 in which it invalidated a 
provision of the Gun Control Act that temporarily enlisted state offic-
ers to perform background checks on gun purchasers.  There, Justice 
Scalia emphasized the need for the prohibition of state and national 
bureaucratic coordination on any terms other than choice.  The 
Printz Court was even more explicit about the separation of state and 
national institutions than in New York, emphasizing as “incontestable” 
its conclusion that the Constitution established “a system of dual sov-
ereignty.”110  The Printz majority also explained its holding as con-
sistent with federalism’s purpose of protecting liberty by preventing 
the monopolization of power.  The ratifications of national enlist-
ment of state administrative resources increase “immeasurably” the 
national government’s power, thereby undermining the “balance” 
necessary for the prevention of tyranny.111 
 
106 Id. 
107 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
108 Id. at 169. 
109 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
110 Id. at 918 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft 501 U.S. 452, 
457 (1991), and Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)).  For a critique of the Court’s 
dual sovereignty argument for commandeering, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political 
Economy of Cooperative Federalism:  Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” 
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998) [hereinafter Hills, Jr., Cooperative Federalism] (agree-
ing with the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine, but on different grounds than a dual 
sovereignty basis). 
111 Id. at 921, 922. 
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II. POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS:  THE RE-ZONING OF POWER 
ALLOCATION 
New York and Printz are significant, not simply because they repre-
sent the continuation of the separatist paradigm, but because they 
constitute a rejection of the Court’s abdication of the judicial en-
forcement of federalism articulated in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority.112  The Garcia Court’s withdrawal ceded federal-
ism enforcement to the political process as a sufficient safeguard of 
state interests.  Broadly speaking there are two large camps in the lit-
erature and jurisprudence of judicial review of the Constitution’s 
federalism structure.  On one side are those who believe that the 
Constitution’s federalism structure can and should be judicially en-
forced as are other constitutional provisions.113  On the other side are 
those who argue that the enforcement of the Constitution’s federal-
ism provisions is distinct from the enforcement of individual rights 
provisions, largely because the political structures protect the states in 
the constitutional system.114  Problematically, both proponents and 
opponents of judicial review of federalism emphasize the initial deci-
sion-making phase of the national-state interaction, without address-
ing subsequent phases or institutions in which state and national rela-
tions take place.  It is solely on this dimension of these two positions 
that this Part will focus. 
The literature on the judicial review of federalism is dominated by 
a particular model of federalism enforcement as the allocation of 
substantive authority between the national government and the 
states.  As stated above, this conception of federalism enforcement 
has both temporal and institutional biases.  It privileges the initial leg-
islative enactment of a particular provision.  If a statute falls within 
Congress’s substantive regulatory authority at the time of its enact-
ment, there does not seem to be a point at which the statute might be 
deemed to be unconstitutional on federalism grounds.  Post-
enactment policy implementation, which largely takes place between 
 
112 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
113 See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Elusive Safeguards of Federalism, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 93, 101 (2001) (imploring the judiciary to check “congressional aggran-
dizement of power”). 
114 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Political Safeguards of Federalism]; Jesse H. 
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States:  The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 
86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:  The Role 
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543, 559 (1954). 
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federal and state administrative officials, does not appear to impact 
the assessment of whether a statute is consistent with the Constitu-
tion’s federalism dictates.115 
A. Federalism as Power Allocation and Institutional Monopolization 
1. The Traditional Model:  Wechsler and Choper 
Professor Herbert Wechsler begins the final section of his classic 
treatment of the political safeguards of state interests, saying:  “If this 
analysis is correct, the national political process in the United 
States—and especially the role of the states in the composition and 
selection of the central government—is intrinsically well-adapted to 
retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain 
of the states.”116  The problem that has marked Wechsler’s project, 
and continues to mark current “political safeguards” theory, is that 
the analysis largely confined itself to the national political process, as 
against the administrative process.  Though Wechsler is surely correct 
to note the role that states might play in preventing “new intrusions” 
that spring from the legislative domain, the implementation of al-
ready-existing policy is perhaps more significant in the interaction be-
tween states and the national government than threatening legisla-
tion.117  The institutional confinement of the political process suggests 
that the only forum for determining national-state interaction is the 
national legislature. 
Though the executive branch is not completely ignored in 
Wechsler’s account,118 it is not altogether clear that he envisions the 
executive performing functions that extend beyond participating in 
the legislative process.  He writes:  “Since [the President’s] programs 
must, in any case, achieve support in Congress—in so far as they in-
 
115 But see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 1225 (2001) [hereinafter Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment] (arguing that 
state bureaucratic actors may be more closely aligned with federal bureaucratic actors 
than they are with other state-level officials). 
116 Wechsler, supra note 114, at 558. 
117 Arguing from a different political process perspective, Bradford Clark argues that the very 
difficulty of any lawmaking in the national legislature is, itself, an important structural 
protection for states, because it makes lawmaking difficult no matter the subject area.  
Bradford R. Clark, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 327, 340–42 (2001). 
118 Wechsler, though recognizing the fact that the modern presidency is the paradigmatic 
“national” figure, argues that “the mode of his selection and the future of his party re-
quire that he also be responsive to local values that have large support within the states.”  
Wechsler, supra note 114, at 557–58. 
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volve new action—he must surmount the greater local sensitivity of 
Congress before anything is done.”119  Wechsler’s focus on Congress 
as the exclusive site of executive activity fails to consider that the Pres-
ident can achieve policy goals within the administrative state.120  To 
that extent, Wechsler’s reliance on the double-barreled protection of 
state governments might be mistaken. 
Another example of the institutionally- and temporally-truncated 
conception of federalism decisionmaking is Professor Jesse Choper’s 
expansion of Wechsler’s argument against judicial review.  In his 
treatment of the executive, Choper focuses on the institutional con-
straints—for example, the role that states play in the nomination 
process—that incentivize presidential candidates and Presidents to 
accommodate state interests.121  However, like Wechsler, Choper ar-
gues that the “strongest assurance” that the President will be respon-
sive to state interests is the “need to maintain rapport with Con-
gress.”122  Again, this suggests that the President’s role in lawmaking is 
limited to what takes place between the President and Congress.  It 
does not recognize the arsenal of authority with which the adminis-
trative state provides the Presidents who, for any number of reasons, 
cannot push a legislative agenda through Congress.123  Indeed, Presi-
dents who have run out of power with a Congress often turn to the 
administrative state as a site of substantive power.  There, the coordi-
nation difficulties that make Congress an unhelpful partner often 
make Congress less capable of radically interfering with policy deci-
sions made at the bureaucratic level. 
But more important than either Wechsler or Choper’s institution-
al myopia is the conception of federalism that underwrites it.  Their 
 
119 Id. at 558. 
120 In fairness to Wechsler, his statement might simply be a fact of the historical period in 
which he wrote, which may have preceded the apex of the administrative presidency.  
This is certainly possible, in the light of the fact that the New Deal regulatory apparatus 
had not reached its full flowering.  For a discussion of the presidency and the administra-
tive state, see RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983).  For a more 
contemporary discussion, see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245 (2001) (discussing the significant power that administrative policymaking provides 
the President).  As will be discussed below, the judiciary has not abdicated responsibility 
for the review of the process and substance of administrative decisionmaking, even 
though it has, through other doctrines (i.e., Chevron deference) deferred to administra-
tive policymaking. 
121 Choper, supra note 114, at 1563–64. 
122 Id. at 1564. 
123 See JOHN D. GRAHAM, BUSH ON THE HOME FRONT:  DOMESTIC POLICY TRIUMPHS AND 
SETBACKS (2010) (discussing the Bush administration’s resort to administrative preemp-
tion of state tort law after its attempts to achieve tort reform legislation were stymied in 
Congress). 
120 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
focus on legislative enactment suggests that federalism decisions are 
made at a single time and involve a decision about the site of authori-
ty; either the national government is empowered by a particular deci-
sion or it is not.  States either win at the legislative enactment stage or 
they lose, and losing is defined as failing to prevent national en-
croachment on substantive authority.  This is exemplified in Choper’s 
argument for why judicial review is unhelpful to states. 
Choper argues that the judiciary had, at least up to 1977, sanc-
tioned every congressionally-enacted expansion of national authority.  
Choper noted that National League of Cities’s limitations on national 
authority were so narrow that Congress would find it easy to avoid its 
restrictions by resorting to other sources of authority under the 
Spending and Commerce Clauses.124  While Choper is correct to 
point out that National League of Cities left Congress with multiple sites 
of substantive regulatory authority, his conclusion that states’ inter-
ests have not been aided rests on the conclusion that the relationship 
between the national government and the states is defined exclusively 
by who has a particular quantum of substantive power.  Under Chop-
er’s reading, the judiciary’s affirmation of the exercise of authority 
ends all possible routes by which a state’s interests might be protect-
ed; there is no other basis for the regulation of national-state interac-
tion, either because at that point the state is a servile subject or be-
cause the national government is incapable of causing states harm.  
Again, this description of federalism ignores every interaction beyond 
the initial statutory enactment as meaningless in the determination of 
whether the Constitution’s federalism values are violated. 
2. Rejecting Political Safeguards and Accepting Allocation 
Some advocates of a judicial role in federalism enforcement have 
based their arguments on originalist and structural theories of consti-
tutional interpretation.125  Others have primarily sought to counter 
the political safeguards thesis.126  However, like the political safe-
 
124 Choper, supra note 114, at 1594–1600. 
125 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1357–91 
(1997) (offering historical evidence in support of the argument that the Constitution and 
its framers intended that there be judicial review of federalism enforcement). 
126 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights:  A Defense of Judicial 
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 103–04 (2004) (arguing that rational igno-
rance prevents citizens from protecting federalism even when it is in the public interest); 
Hamilton, supra note 111 (exposing historic and empirical deficiencies in the political 
safeguards thesis); see also Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001) (arguing that theories pro-
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guards proponents, the advocates of judicial review based on the 
“failure” of political safeguards argument also advance arguments 
that conceptualize federalism decisionmaking in institutionally- and 
temporally-limited frameworks.  These scholars have accepted a role 
for the judiciary in federalism enforcement, but have also accepted 
that this role will involve only allocation of substantive authority be-
tween the national government and the states, involving the invalida-
tion of congressional authority to enact legislation, rather than an en-
forcement of other sites of state and national interaction. 
An example of this argument is the work of Professors John 
McGinnis and Ilya Somin, who have articulated a principal-agent 
model to demonstrate the failure of the political process to safeguard 
federalism values.  Specifically, they argue that neither national nor 
state-level agents have an interest in providing the federalism en-
forcement that their principals—the citizenry—want.127  Although 
McGinnis and Somin have included state actors in their description 
of the institutional dynamic that impacts federalism enforcement, 
their analyses of various areas of state-national interaction are not 
concerned with anything more than the initial decision of whether to 
enact a statute or not.  For example, in criticizing the Supreme 
Court’s failure to rein in Congress’s use of conditional spending, 
McGinnis and Somin argue that spending legislation is enacted be-
cause states that favor a particular policy seek to have their policy 
choice subsidized by the national government by forcing other states 
to accept their choice through the attachments of conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds.128  While this description may be correct in 
some respects about the origin of conditional spending legislation, it 
does not explain how spending authority is actually deployed in the 
implementation of national policy.  For McGinnis and Somin, the 
fact of spending statutes, by themselves, suggests that states are at risk 
of being dominated by the national government.129  This suggests that 
the only protection that states have is at the stage of initial allocation. 
 
moting process-based theories of federalism enforcement as the exclusive safeguard of 
the federal system are inconsistent with the Constitution’s text, structure and history). 
127 McGinnis & Somin, supra note 126, at 99–100. 
128 Id. at 115–18. 
129 This is not very far from arguments that Somin has made about the threat the spending 
authority poses for state governments.  See Somin, supra note 28, at 464–73. 
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B. Updating Political Safeguards:  Larry Kramer’s Misdiagnosis 
Larry Kramer represents the most sophisticated contemporary 
update of the political safeguards model.  Kramer’s defense of politi-
cal safeguards moves beyond descriptions of the Congress and the 
Executive as the exclusive institutions in federalism enforcement, to 
include examination of the role political parties play in national-state 
interaction.130  Kramer’s conception of the role that parties play in 
protecting the interests of states sees federalism as contestation 
against the center.  Rather than relying on state institutions, which 
might prove vulnerable to ideological cooptation by the center, the 
rise of the political party allows for contestation against the center, 
thereby offering states a shelter in which their claims might reside.131 
But what makes political parties a dominant institution in federal-
ism enforcement?  Kramer explains that political parties regulate na-
tional-state interaction by connecting the fates of national and state 
officials.132  Such linked fates are demonstrated by what Kramer de-
scribes as the relatively pragmatic philosophical position of American 
political parties, which values electoral success over ideological com-
mitment.  Kramer argues that political parties are motivated to max-
 
130 Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1522–41 (1994) [here-
inafter Kramer, Understanding Federalism].  See also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 
17; Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 40; Hills, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, supra note 
109.  Beyond legal scholarship these discussions have been prominent in political science 
literature for generations.  See, e.g., NUGENT, supra note 35; KIMBERLEY S. JOHNSON, 
GOVERNING THE NEW AMERICAN STATE:  CONGRESS AND THE NEW FEDERALISM, 1877–1929 
(2007); JANE PERRY CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM:  FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1965). 
131 Kramer, Political Safeguards of Federalism, supra note 114, at 268–78 (2000).  Kramer’s in-
sight allows us to understand the dynamics of federalism’s shifting allies.  For example, 
the period from 2003–2007 marked one of the longest periods during which the Demo-
cratic Party was in control of no national political institution—White House, Senate, or 
House of Representatives.  It is no shock that during this time, Democrats began to speak 
more favorably of state interests in the face of federal impositions than at any other time 
since the Civil Rights Movement, and since the “states’ rights Democrats” of the 1960s.  
Kramer allows us to see federalism as an element of the toolkit of contestation against the 
center.  For discussions of this in my own work, see Copeland, Ex Parte Young, supra note 
46, at 850–51 (2009).  Most recently, this is underscored by the fact that of the twenty-six 
states to challenge the constitutionality of the ACA, twenty-five were Republican Attorneys 
General.  See Kevin Sack & Eric Lichtblau, For Attorneys General, Long Shot Brings Payoffs, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/us/politics/for-
attorneys-general-health-law-long-shot-brings-payoffs.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&page want-
ed=all&adxnnlx=1346677238-VfJFUcPuaemsFXNbYIr0Mw. 
132 For a contemporary example of this phenomenon, see Mike Tobin, Some GOP-led States 
Plan to Resist Health Care Law, as Ruling Reins in Medicaid Expansion, FOXNEWS.COM (June 
30, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/06/29/some-gop-led-states-plan-to-
resist-health-care-law-despite-ruling/ (describing Republican state officials’ support for 
Mitt Romney’s national presidential campaign). 
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imize their electoral success across geographical boundaries.  This in-
centive transcends election cycles and transforms the way that states 
and the national government interact in policy formation and gov-
ernance.  Kramer describes the connections as follows:  
“[C]andidates at one level accept aid from party organizations at oth-
er levels and cultivate party-based relationships with candidates at 
these other levels.  And this, in turn, affects what they do in office.”133  
In short, “[political] parties influence[] federalism by establishing a 
framework for politics in which officials at different levels [are] de-
pendent on each other to get (and stay) elected.”134  Kramer’s con-
ception makes more explicit than either Wechsler’s or Choper’s the 
fact that political parties introduce a dimension of temporal exten-
sion that changes the dynamics of national-state interaction. 
Kramer seeks to demonstrate the strength of his thesis by describ-
ing how the existence of the Republican Party during the Civil War 
affected the North’s ability to recruit for the Civil War.  Kramer ar-
gues that the party structure shaped the interactions between states 
and the central government by creating “a shared desire to see the 
war successfully prosecuted so as to ensure a Republican victory at 
both levels in upcoming elections.”135  Kramer compares this to the 
South where there were no political parties.  Kramer argues that the 
absence of political parties allowed the Confederate states to resist 
any attempts at centralization by the Confederate government.  Kra-
mer writes:  “[P]arty connection establishes a bond that encourages 
government officials to pay attention to each other’s needs and inter-
 
133 Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 130, at 1529.  At the risk of overstating Kra-
mer’s claim, he does not see political parties as consciously setting out to “allocate power” 
between the states and the national government, but that political parties provide per-
haps the most significant constraint on national actors’ ambitions to override state au-
thority.  Id. at 1492, 1536. 
134 Id. at 1536.  Critics of Kramer’s reliance on political parties argue that he conflates an 
incidental feature of political parties—decentralization—with an essential characteris-
tic—the objective of maximizing electoral success.  Understanding electoral success as a 
constitutive characteristic of political parties, they argue, would reveal the extent to which 
decentralization is merely a strategic choice to achieve the goal of the maximization of 
electoral success.  This means that there is nothing inherent in political parties that 
makes them more likely to support state interests.  See Paul Frymer & Albert Yoon, Political 
Parties, Representation, and Federal Safeguards, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 986–87 (2002) (point-
ing to the changes that American political parties have undergone to highlight that max-
imization of electoral success requires parties to transform in ways not amenable to the 
maximization of state authority in an abstract sense, including the nationalization of po-
litical party agendas in the last generation). 
135 Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 130, at 1541. 
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ests.”136  The enduring bonds that Kramer highlights in political par-
ties might be present in other aspects of national-state interaction, 
such as emergency relief by the national government.137  But what is 
more important is that these models of interaction do not seem ca-
pable of serving as models for federalism enforcement for Kramer.138  
Kramer is surely correct to recognize that party affiliation establishes 
a context and framework for national and state interaction in a tem-
porally-extended relationship that likely has some effect on national-
state interaction.  What is less clear, in the light of this recognition, is 
why he remains committed to a conceptual framework that limits 
federalism enforcement to the allocation of power.  For Kramer, the 
“problem of federalism is, above all, the problem of allocation.”139  
However, the description of federalism’s life does not provide us with 
any greater understanding of how parties affect a decision about allo-
cation. 
In the above account, Kramer’s description of federalism practice 
is marked by enduring bonds that give rise to mutual solicitude.  
While these may be quite appropriate descriptions for federalism in 
practice, Kramer’s emphasis on them is inconsistent with a concep-
tion of federalism as “allocation.”  Why has Kramer provided us with 
such a compelling account of federalism in practice, only to offer an 
explanation of its regulation by reference to a practice that appears 
so ill suited?  Rather than relying on the received wisdom with regard 
to what federalism primarily entails, it would have been more helpful 
had Kramer employed his positive theory of federalism’s practice to 
inform his overarching theory of federalism enforcement.  In short, if 
interdependence and intertemporality are significant constraints on 
state and national attempts to violate the federalism structure, then 
why are we not shown how these dimensions of the relationship 
 
136 Id. at 1542.  Kramer’s argument is called into question by the ongoing battle between the 
Obama Administration and three Democratic state governors over the Secured Commu-
nities Program.  The Governors of Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York have each 
sought to withdraw their participation from the program, which aims to remove illegal 
immigrants from the United States who are guilty of serious criminal offenses.  These 
Governors (and the Mayor of Boston) have argued that the aggressive federal enforce-
ment of the program is disrupting their relationships with immigrant communities and 
has negatively impacted their efforts to reduce crime in immigrant communities.  See Ja-
son Buch, States at Odds Over U.S. Plan, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 13, 2011, at 
11A. 
137 For a brilliant discussion of Hurricane Katrina and the national-state relationship, see 
ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 17–27 (2011). 
138 But see Copeland, Federal Law in State Court, supra note 46 (arguing for a model of federal-
ism enforcement as interest-inclusion based on doctrine of federal courts law). 
139 Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 130, at 1544. 
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might inform federalism’s enforcement?  The answer seems to be 
that the embedded nature of the national-state relationship is not ca-
pable of judicial enforcement for any number of reasons.140  However, 
Kramer’s account might have at the very least shifted the perspective 
of those who think of line-drawing around substantive power as the 
only aspect of federalism enforcement worthy of note.  A rejection of 
this by Kramer would have been a significant advance in the conver-
sation. 
The incongruity between Kramer’s descriptive updates of the po-
litical safeguards thesis and his conception of federalism enforcement 
is also demonstrated in his description of administrative implementa-
tion of policy.  Kramer’s recognition of the administrative state as a 
site of federal-state interaction is a significant advance in the political 
safeguards model.  He emphasizes the role that states play in the im-
plementation of national policy in health care, criminal law enforce-
ment, and other domains.  Against claims that states are incapable of 
protecting their interests in the administrative state, Kramer argues 
that administrative implementation protects states’ interests.  As 
Kramer describes it, federalism values are protected in the adminis-
trative state in two ways:  (1) state implementation of national policy 
through cooperative programs; and (2) congressional protection of 
state governments. 
Kramer argues that state implementation of national policy “gives 
[state and local officials] a degree of control over policy and a voice 
in Congress.”141  Though Kramer recognizes the fact that federal su-
pervision and potential fund cut-offs threaten states to conform to 
national commands, Kramer differentiates between these “formal 
powers”142 and other exercises of authority.  Kramer likens the na-
tional government’s exercise of authority to that of a manager who 
deploys her formal authority in ways that “consider the needs and in-
 
140 These might be comprehensible as areas for judicial enforcement if understood as a form 
of “common law” constitutional decisionmaking, of the sort that the Supreme Court has 
engaged throughout its history and as a federalism enforcement mechanism.  For a dis-
cussion and defense of this, see Copeland, Federal Law in State Court, supra note 46, at 55–
62; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword:  Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1975).  For criticisms of this common law practice in the federalism context, see John F. 
Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 2003, 2056 n.234 (2009) (rejecting what he sees as the Rehnquist Court’s enforce-
ment of non-textual federalism constraints in areas such as clear statement rules and sov-
ereign immunity); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and 
the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L. J. 569, 613–15 (1987) (rejecting non-
textual basis of the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
141 Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 130, at 1543. 
142 Id. at 1544. 
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terests of subordinates.”  Kramer emphasizes the “mutual depend-
ence” between the national government and the states as an addi-
tional guarantee of the state’s voice in policy implementation in ways 
that refute the claim that states are left as mere functionaries in bu-
reaucratic implementation.  Though Kramer does not suggest that 
these factors mean federalism is no longer a concern, but rather that 
“the fact of sharing and the role of states in administration is an as-
pect of federalism that needs to be considered in deciding what we 
do need to worry about.”143  Unfortunately, Kramer does not go fur-
ther than this insight.  He does not identify what needs to be worried 
about in the light of the fact of state-national “sharing.”  This is the 
closest Kramer comes to challenging the allocation framework that 
dominates federalism enforcement.  This Article aims to move from 
Kramer’s insight to identifying, at least in broad outline, some ways in 
which we might respond to Kramer’s challenge. 
III.  MEDICAID:  INTERACTION AND THE PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM 
As addressed in Part II, scholars have recently turned their atten-
tion to policy implementation and the administrative state as an im-
portant site of national-state interaction.  However, despite its having 
been at the center of two significant cases of the 2011 Supreme Court 
Term, the Medicaid program has not received very much attention.144  
Medicaid is often cited as one of the paradigmatic examples of coop-
erative federalism in American legislative history.145  Indeed, it is not 
hyperbolic to declare Medicaid as the most significant federal-state 
program in American history.146  Medicaid relies on states to adminis-
ter programs that provide access to medical care for the indigent, and 
reimburses state governments for a portion of the costs incurred.  
 
143 Id. at 1546. 
144 The first case of the 2011 Supreme Court Term involved the existence of a private right 
of action against state governments challenging cuts in Medicaid.  See Douglas v. Indep. 
Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).  In early articles on the challenge to the ACA, there 
was almost no coverage of the Medicaid challenge.  See, e.g.,  John Schwartz, The Supreme 
Court and Obama’s Health Care Law, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/12/19/weekinreview/19schwartz.html?pagewanted=1&ref=affordablecareact (citing re-
marks of Professors Randy Barnett, Michael McConnell, and Mark Tushnet, among oth-
ers, but failing even to mention the Medicaid challenge). 
145 See e.g., Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Rhetoric Hits the Road:  State Challenges to the Afforda-
ble Care Act Implementation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 787 (2012) (“Medicaid is the quintes-
sential cooperative federalism program.”). 
146 Federal Medicaid spending has grown from approximately $1.2 billion in its first year, to 
over $330 billion in 2007.  It accounts for over 15% of the nation’s total health care 
spending.  It has grown faster than Medicare, with an enrollment that is larger than Med-
icare’s since 2001.  LAURA KATZ OLSON, THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID 1–2 (2010). 
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The national government conditions state receipt of federal reim-
bursement funds on the states’ conformance with federal policy.  The 
Medicaid Expansion provision, which will be explained in detail be-
low, follows the same path. 
This Part provides a brief history of the Medicaid program as an 
example of cooperative federalism.  This history will provide the de-
scriptive foundation upon which this Article’s normative critique of 
the Court’s opinion in National Federation rests.  It primarily aims to 
describe the bureaucratic dimension of Medicaid’s implementation.  
This will be done through a description of state interaction with the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) (formerly the 
Health Care Financing Administration) in the government provision 
of medical insurance for the poor. 
A.  The Road to Medicare:  Non-Inevitable Interaction 
The Medicaid program was established in 1965 under Title XIX of 
the Social Security Act.147  Though it has been suggested that Medi-
caid was an “afterthought” in the fight to expand healthcare access 
for the aged, Medicaid did not arise out of this air.148  What came to 
be known as Medicaid had its genesis in earlier legislative efforts to 
provide national support for healthcare access.  Given the fact that 
Medicaid was enacted in the same legislation as Medicare, which was 
a completely federal entitlement, Medicaid’s cooperative structure 
requires explanation.  The legislative precursors of Medicaid provide 
explanation for Medicaid’s ultimate structure. 
1.  Steps Toward a Federal Role in the Era of Futility 
In the late 1930s, progressives attempted to harness the momen-
tum of the New Deal expansion of social support exemplified in the 
Old Age Survivors Insurance,149 which ameliorated the risk of age’s 
effects on an individual’s financial well-being.  In 1937, the Interde-
partmental Committee to Coordinate Health and Welfare undertook 
 
147 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006). 
148 DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY:  1965–2007, at 34–
35 (2008) [hereinafter SMITH & MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS].  See also OLSON, supra note 
146, at 1 (describing initial beliefs that Medicaid was “Medicare’s friendless stepchild, 
created in [Medicare’s] shadow and catering to a politically powerless clientele”).  Smith 
and Moore appear to see more forethought in what became Medicaid as compared to Ol-
son, who describes the program saying:  “No one designed [Medicaid].  Rather it is a 
perplexing Rube Goldberg of incremental adjustments and periodic enhancement or 
cutbacks, at both the national level and the state level, which rarely work in concert.”  Id. 
149 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006). 
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a study of the nation’s health needs and national health policy, which 
it forwarded to President Roosevelt in 1939.150  The Committee’s re-
port included recommendations for cooperative policies, including 
extending federal grants to states for both the construction of hospi-
tal facilities and the provision of medical care to the needy.151  How-
ever, President Roosevelt did not respond energetically to these pro-
posals, instead forwarding the report and recommendations to 
Congress for “careful study.”152  Senator Robert Wagner, a progressive 
Democrat from New York, was convinced to introduce legislation that 
included the Committee’s recommendations.  Its failure to move out 
of committee foreshadowed the fate of health care legislation over 
the next several years. 
Again in early 1942 Senator Wagner joined with Senators Murray 
and Dingell in proposing legislation described as “the most ambitious 
of Senator Wagner’s legislative proposals and the most comprehen-
sive domestic proposal introduced by anyone during the war years.”153  
The legislation called for national compulsory health insurance and 
short and long-term disability insurance.  Given President Roosevelt’s 
attention to the war effort, and a less receptive political climate for 
expansive government programs, the legislation received no signifi-
cant support and died in committee.154 
At the end of World War II advocates saw opportunities for expan-
sion of the social safety net; in May 1945 the Wagner-Murray-Dingell 
bill was reintroduced in Congress.  Though the legislation was largely 
the same, this time its proponents had the support of the White 
House.  President Harry Truman endorsed the legislation, even 
speaking out on its behalf in his radio address to the nation in 1946.  
Truman saw the cause of increased access to medical care both as an 
issue of social security, and also national security, as he learned that 
one-third of all military draftees were not fit for military service be-
cause of “physical or mental deficiencies.”155  As a result, Truman’s 
became the first presidential administration in favor of national 
health insurance.156  The forces arrayed against the Wagner-Murray-
Dingell legislation—including a coalition of the powerful American 
Medical Association, southern Democrats, and conservative Republi-
 
150 SMITH & MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS, supra note 148, at 22–23. 
151 Id. at 23. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 25. 
154 Id. at 24–25. 
155 Id. at 25–26. 
156 Id. 
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cans—successfully defeated subsequent attempts to even get the bill 
reported out of committee.157  Even after Truman’s 1948 re-election, 
which included increased Democratic majorities in both the House 
and Senate, the bill could not get out of committee.  Repeated legis-
lative defeats—along with the desire for a return to normalcy after 
the Great Depression and World War II—stalled the development of 
a national healthcare policy.158  Each of these shaped the paths availa-
ble for advocates of an increased governmental role in protecting ac-
cess to medical care for vulnerable populations. 
2.  The Road Toward Medicaid and Federalism’s Interaction 
Even after the post-war economic boom made it possible for work-
ing- and middle-class Americans to access medical care through em-
ployer-based insurance, the elderly remained outside of medical 
markets, as insurers avoided including these high-cost customers in 
their insurance pools.159  One of the first post-war steps of national 
health policy was the enactment of the Hill-Burton Hospital Survey 
and Construction Act.  Enacted in 1946, the Hill-Burton Act provided 
federal grants and federally-guaranteed loans to states for the im-
provement and construction of hospitals.  Hill-Burton played a signif-
icant role in reducing the shortage of hospital beds, especially in ru-
ral areas.160  Hill-Burton relied on states to determine how money 
would be distributed to local and county governments.161  Another 
significant legislative step toward Medicaid was the Social Security 
Amendments of 1950, which provided federal funds to state govern-
ments for direct payments to medical care vendors.162  At the time, 
states could provide assistance for medical care only by diverting 
money from a recipient’s public assistance stipend.  The payments 
 
157 Id. at 24. 
158 Jonathan Engel notes that by 1952, the issue of government-sponsored health insurance 
was “notably absent from the American political debate.”  JONATHAN ENGEL, POOR 
PEOPLE’S MEDICINE:  MEDICAID AND AMERICAN CHARITY CARE SINCE 1965, at 30 (2006). 
159 Id. at 30–32. 
160 Hill-Burton has played a significant role in provision of care to the poor.  Under the Act, 
hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funding were required to treat uninsured patients. 
161 SMITH & MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS, supra note 148, at 28. 
162 Gloria Nicole Eldridge, The Medicaid Evolution:  The Political Economy of Medicaid 
Federalism, 68 (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, Austin), 
http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/3110/eldridgeg33217.pdf?se
quence=2. 
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were paid in cash directly to the recipient, who was then expected to 
find medical care.163 
The 1950 Amendments established a federal match on the condi-
tion that states submit a plan that provided that medical expenses 
would be paid directly to service providers.164  In order to participate, 
states were required to submit a plan to the Social Security Admin-
istration that described the content of services covered under the 
plan payments.  Eligibility for participation in the program depended 
on a recipient’s participation in the Old Age Survivors Insurance (So-
cial Security).  Thus, medical expenses would be provided for in addi-
tion to a recipient’s public assistance support, rather than being de-
ducted from other support, as had been the case previously.  The 
receipt of public assistance benefits was the eligibility requirement for 
participation in the program.  Throughout the 1950s the federal 
match formula was liberalized.  By 1960, 80% of the states had taken 
advantage of the medical vendor matching funds.165  Over the decade 
from 1950 to 1960, federal payments grew from $81 million to $514 
million.166  The 1950 Amendments clearly foreshadowed the Medicare 
program, not only in the cooperative structure, and federal matching 
funds, but also in the payment of medical fees directly to service pro-
viders.  But the very fact of its success in Congress meant that the 
1950 Amendments would serve as a prototype for any future expan-
sions of the provision of medical care for the poor. 
The final, pre-Medicaid expansion of the government’s involve-
ment in guaranteeing access to medical care came in the 1960 
amendments to the Social Security Act, known as the Kerr-Mills Act.  
The Act established a federal matching grant (ranging from 50–80% 
of the costs, depending on the per capita wealth of the state) to state 
governments for medical costs of persons over sixty-five not receiving 
public assistance, but whose incomes were inadequate to provide for 
their medical necessities.167  Kerr-Mills expanded the federal govern-
ment’s role in the provision of medical care beyond those receiving 
public assistance to include those over sixty-five who would meet with 
financial ruin if they were left to pay their own medical expenses. 
As with the 1950 Amendments, Kerr-Mills left many of the most 
significant decisions up to state governments, including determina-
 
163 SMITH & MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS, supra note 148, at 34.  Smith and Moore argue that 
the policy pleased no one except opponents of all forms of public assistance. 
164 Eldridge, supra note 162, at 68. 
165 SMITH & MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS, supra note 148, at 35. 
166 Id. 
167 SMITH & MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS, supra note 148, at 39. 
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tions of eligibility and services covered under the federal match pro-
gram.  While some states were as generous as the federal program al-
lowed, other states, mindful of the costs of even a 20% share, set 
greater restrictions than required under Kerr-Mills.168  The services 
covered under the state plans varied widely.  For example, fewer than 
half of the plans included dental care within covered services, and 
25% of the plans covered only hospital care, even to the exclusion of 
physician services. Many states transferred recipients from Old Age 
Survivors Insurance-based medical programs (the 1950 Amend-
ments) to the program established by Kerr-Mills.  By 1965, forty states 
had established American Medical Association (“AMA”) programs 
under Kerr-Mills.169 
B.  Medicaid:  The Paradigm of Cooperative Federalism 
There continued to be concern for elderly access to medical care 
even after the passage of the Kerr-Mills Act.  Rising costs on state gov-
ernments and the variation among state plans, if states participated at 
all, led to calls for Medicare.  Shortly after the 1960 election, legisla-
tion was introduced to provide for the hospital costs of all Social Se-
curity beneficiaries.  Opponents of Medicare, primarily the American 
Medical Association, called for an expansion of Kerr-Mills rather than 
a fully federal Medicare program.  President Lyndon Johnson seized 
upon calls for both an expansion of Kerr-Mills and the establishment 
of Medicare.  Providing medical assistance to the poor through an 
expanded Kerr-Mills was thought to provide a hedge against the 
growth of Medicare, and the weakening of the integrity of Social Se-
curity by reducing pressure for a universal, single-payer health care 
system, i.e., Medicare for all.170  While there was significant debate on 
Medicare, Medicaid occasioned little debate in Congress.171  Though 
for many this is evidence of the Medicaid program’s add-on quality; 
the fundamental structures of the Medicaid program, including its 
cooperative framework, were the result of legislative developments 
since the end of World War II.  The Social Security Amendments that 
included Medicare and Medicaid were passed overwhelmingly by the 
 
168 Id. at 41 (reporting that under Kerr-Mills, half the plans did not cover dental care, and 
one-fourth only covered hospital care). 
169 Many poorer states could not afford to participate in Kerr-Mills.  See id.  
170 SMITH & MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS, supra note 148, at 42–43. 
171 Judith D. Moore & David G. Smith, Legislating Medicaid:  Considering Medicaid and Its Ori-
gins, 27 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 45, 48 (2005–2006) [hereinafter Moore & Smith, 
Legislating Medicaid] (stating that there was so little debate on Medicaid that the legislative 
draftsman said “he could scarcely recall working on Medicaid”). 
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House and Senate, and were signed with great fanfare before an au-
dience that included former President Harry Truman.172 
Medicaid replicated key aspects of both the 1950 Amendments 
and Kerr-Mills in both its reliance on state governments to administer 
Medicaid and reimbursement of state governments at rates that de-
pended on their relative wealth measured against the national aver-
age.  State participation in the Medicaid program has always been 
voluntary, but if a state chooses to participate in the Medicare pro-
gram, it is required to comply with certain regulations imposed by 
both the Medicaid Act and the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices.  Under Medicaid, state governments have had wide discretion 
in the design of their programs, including discretion to change eligi-
bility standards.  Despite the discretion, Medicaid sought to reduce 
the variability among programs that undermined Kerr-Mills.  States 
participating in Medicaid were required to provide for certain man-
datory benefits.173  Medicaid also imposed a requirement of 
“statewideness,” that obligated the state to identical treatment of all 
geographic units within the state. 
From the very commencement of the state’s participation in Med-
icaid, the state bureaucracy had been drawn into a close interactive 
relationship with the federal bureaucracy.  Medicaid’s structure was, 
at least in part, a product of national bureaucratic experience with 
state welfare agencies during earlier eras of cooperative welfare poli-
cy.174  In order to participate in the Medicaid program, states were re-
quired to submit a Medicaid plan to the Bureau of Family Services 
and the Division of Medical Services.  The state plan must have articu-
lated the optional services, if any, that the state would cover under its 
Medicaid program, and must have indicated how the state would ful-
fill its obligations under the Medicaid Act.  States were allowed to 
amend their state plans, but were required to file them with CMS.  
State plan amendments that constitute material changes to the state 
 
172 The final vote was 307-116 in the House of Representatives and 70-24 in the Senate. 
173 The required benefit services are:  (1) inpatient hospital care, including hospitalization 
for mental illness; (2) outpatient hospital care; (3) laboratory and x-ray services; (4) 
skilled nursing home services; and (5) physician’s services.  Services such as dental care, 
prescription drugs, and physical therapy, among others, were included as optional ser-
vices that the state could elect to provide.  Moore & Smith, Legislating Medicaid, supra note 
171, at 50. 
174 Smith and Moore note that previous welfare policy programs, including Public Assistance 
and Kerr-Mills, had brought national and state administrators into contact.  They write:  
“Both federal and state officials had been through the initial implementation of Kerr-
Mills with its rituals of advance explanation, letters to governors and state officials, publi-
cations and conferences, technical assistance, and advisory groups.”  SMITH & MOORE, 
MEDICAID POLITICS, supra note 148, at 61. 
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plan must have been approved by the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare.  The basic purpose of the state plans was to reduce the 
effects of “political spoils,” racial discrimination, and other biases.  
The underlying threat from the federal government was that if states 
did not spend according to the approved plan, including its amend-
ments, their federal reimbursement funds would be terminated. 
Termination of state reimbursement funds is easier said than 
done.  David Smith and Judith Moore state that federal withholding 
of reimbursement funds was rarely used to enforce Medicaid re-
quirements.  They liken national and state interaction to long-term 
relationships saying:  “Like kinship or other inescapable unions, 
much depended in practice on mutual understandings, often unspo-
ken, about how to play the game without breaking up.”175  In light of 
the difficulty of state exit or federal eviction from the Medicaid rela-
tionship, the implementation of Medicaid involved negotiation be-
tween state and national bureaucracies.  One of the most significant 
developments in implementation of Medicaid has been the rise of the 
waiver process as the method by which states and the national gov-
ernment negotiate changes, some significant, in the delivery of medi-
cal services at the state level. 
Several different presidential administrations have sought to re-
spond to the challenges of national budgetary crises, realign national 
priorities, and expand insurance coverage through the Medicaid 
program.176  Recently, Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush 
(“Bush Jr.”) increasingly sought to expand state discretion by allow-
ing states to apply for waivers to obtain relief from certain Medicaid 
requirements.177  Though the waiver process within the Social Security 
Act was enacted prior to the enactment of Medicaid, it has become a 
central aspect of the national-state interaction in the implementation 
of Medicaid.  States can apply for two types of waivers under the Med-
icaid program:  program (Section 1915)—demonstration (Section 
 
175 Id. at 64. 
176 See, e.g., Colleen M. Grogan & Elizabeth Rigby, Federalism, Partisan Politics, and Shifting 
Support for State Flexibility:  The Case of the U.S. State Children’s Health Insurance Program, 39 
PUBLIUS:  J. OF FEDERALISM 47, 50–51 (2008) (profiling President Clinton’s expansion of 
Medicaid).  For a discussion of other presidential initiatives see Eldridge, supra note 162, 
at 168–82 (discussing presidential policies for Medicaid changes in the Nixon, Ford, and 
Carter Administrations). 
177 See, e.g., Frank J. Thompson & Courtney Burke, Federalism by Waiver:  MEDICAID and the 
Transformation of Long-term Care, 39 PUBLIUS:  J. OF FEDERALISM 22, 36–38  (2008) [herein-
after Thompson & Burke, Federalism by Waiver] (explaining how waivers “flourished” in 
the Clinton and Bush administrations). 
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1115) waivers.178  As the name suggests, states apply for waivers to re-
ceive relief from obligations under the Social Security Act in order to 
improve service or expand access to Medicaid.  The Medicaid waiver 
process demonstrates the significance of bureaucratic implementa-
tion in the development of the provision of medical care for the 
poor.  A former Administrator of Health Care Financing Administra-
tion (“HCFA”), David Vladeck, reported that in the early 1990s “all 
the health policy action was taking place in the Medicaid waiver sec-
tor.”179 
As stated above, Medicaid’s structure allows states considerable 
discretion in the design of state programs.  Nevertheless, states clam-
ored for more programmatic discretion to respond to the increasing 
costs of health care.  Prior to the Clinton Administration, the federal 
government did not actively encourage state exploitation of the waiv-
er process.180  Reagan Administration officials feared that the grant of 
waivers would allow states to shift expenses to the federal govern-
ment.  In response, the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), 
which played an increasingly prominent role in the Reagan bureau-
 
178 Demonstration waivers—known as Section 1115 waivers—allow states to undertake exper-
imental or pilot programs to try new initiatives in Medicaid.  As stated above, these pilot 
programs have involved expanding the eligibility for Medicaid to include populations not 
covered by the act—for example, by expanding Medicaid to include the uninsured par-
ents of children eligible for the State Child Health Insurance Program (“SCHIP”).  Sec-
tion 1115 waivers have been marked by a shift in states to move Medicaid recipients from 
public health insurance programs into managed care programs.  These include Florida, 
Oregon, and Tennessee, among others.  These transformations generally included ex-
pansions in the class of eligible Medicaid recipients.  Frank J. Thompson & Courtney 
Burke, Executive Federalism and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers:  Implications for Policy and 
Democratic Process, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 971, 979 (2007) [hereinafter Thompson 
& Burke, Executive Federalism].  Program waivers—known as Section 1915 waivers—allow 
states to restructure their Medicaid programs to allow for alternative health delivery 
mechanisms.  These waivers have allowed state governments to provide home-based 
health care for aging and mentally ill persons as opposed to the provision of institutional-
ized services in nursing homes, despite the Medicaid Act’s requirement that states pro-
vide nursing home care.  Section 1915 waivers also relaxed Medicaid’s “statewide-ness” 
obligation by allowing states to restrict the geographic scope of home-based health care 
services.  See Thompson & Burke, Federalism by Waiver, supra note 177, at 24. 
179 Interview by Bruce Vladeck and Judy Moore with David Smith, CMS ORAL HISTORY 
PROJECT 712, at 723 (July 7, 2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-
Information/History/downloads/cmsoralhistory.pdf (discussing the growth of Section 
1115 waivers during the Clinton Administration). 
180 Prior to 1993, the federal government had granted approximately fifty Medicaid waivers.  
In the Clinton and Bush Administrations, from 1993–2006, over 120 Medicaid waivers 
were granted.  Thompson & Burke, Executive Federalism, supra note 178 at 980. 
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cracy,181 required the HCFA to impose a budget neutrality require-
ment in their review of state waiver applications.182  As such there was 
frustration among governors about the absence of greater flexibility 
in the administration of the Medicaid program. 
Having been elected from the Governor’s mansion of Arkansas, 
Clinton knew firsthand the frustration of having an expensive coop-
erative program that offered little practical flexibility to state gov-
ernments.183  As a result, giving state governments greater flexibility in 
the implementation of Medicaid was a key priority for Clinton.184  In 
addition to the flexibility offered to state governments, to the extent 
that waivers in the delivery of social welfare benefits allow for experi-
mentation and policy learning, they embody the “laboratories of de-
mocracy” justification for federalism.185  Waivers under the then-Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children provided the flexibility with 
which states began to reform welfare.186  These efforts played an im-
portant role in the shape of the national legislation that transformed 
the program.187  Ironically, Medicaid waivers played a role in Massa-
chusetts’ development of its universal medical insurance program, 
which included a mandate that was essentially copied in the ACA.188 
Medicaid waivers have played a significant role in the transfor-
mation of Medicaid for nearly two decades.189  Two of the most signif-
icant transformations in Medicaid have been the state-driven expan-
 
181 For more on Presidential oversight of agency decisionmaking through the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, see Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking:  The 
Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1060–63 (1986). 
182 Thompson & Burke, Executive Federalism, supra note 178, at 974–75.  Effective September 
24, 2001, the Health Care Financing Administration changed its name to the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”).  See Program Memorandum, Transmittal AB-
01-173 (Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/ Guid-
ance/Transmittals/Downloads/AB01173.pdf. 
183 Carol S. Weissert & William G. Weissert, Medicaid Waivers:  License to Shape the Future of Fis-
cal Federalism, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 160–61 
(Timothy J. Conlon & Paul L. Posner, eds., 2008). 
184 Vladeck & Moore, supra note 179, at 722.  One of the most significant changes that the 
Clinton Administration made to the Medicaid waiver policy was revising the Reagan Ad-
ministration’s budget neutrality requirement.  Under Clinton, the assessment of budget 
neutrality would be made over the life of the demonstration covered by the waiver, rather 
than on an annual basis.  Eldridge, supra note 162, at 244. 
185 For a wonderful discussion of the “laboratories” justification of federalism, see Ryan, Fed-
eralism and the Tug of War Within, supra note 51, at 601–19.  Ryan insightfully notes that 
this justification of federalism is often at odds with other goals. 
186 Jocelyn M. Johnston, Welfare Reform:  A Devolutionary Success, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Timothy J. Conlon & Paul L. Posner, eds. 2008). 
187 WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 183, at 25. 
188 Id. at 163–64. 
189 OLSON, supra note 146, at 71–74, 85–92. 
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sions of Medicaid eligibility in the 1990s through the waiver process.  
For example, through the waiver process Utah expanded eligibility to 
previously ineligible populations.  The program provided only basic 
benefits—physical visits and emergency room care, primarily.  Many 
of the expansions were provided for by the increasing introduction of 
managed care, or the reduction in services.  Many of the state innova-
tions that took place during this period were a result of waivers of 
such Medicaid obligations as statewideness, allowing states to dissect 
the Medicaid population for different experimental projects.  Similar-
ly, states received waiver for the “freedom of choice” requirement 
that allowed Medicaid recipients to choose between Medicaid and 
managed care.  Waivers allowed states to essentially force recipients 
into managed care programs.  The latest negotiated waiver involves 
Oregon’s comprehensive reform of its Medicaid program to provide 
a holistic approach to the provision of medical services, including 
physical, mental, and social work services.190  The waiver was approved 
on July 5, 2012, and totaled 120 pages.191 
Medicaid waivers involved significant “bargaining” and negotia-
tion between state and federal bureaucratic officials.  Bruce Vladeck 
has pointed out that these negotiations often involved “under-the-
table deals” and “sheer intimidation.”192  What is important for the 
purposes of this discussion is the extent to which the waiver process 
involves the bureaucracy, rather than Congress, in the implementa-
tion of significant federalism-implicating policy decisions.  Gloria El-
dridge transfers authority from Congress to the administrative offi-
cials who are involved in the back-and-forth of negotiating policy 
intricacies with state officials.  Though many policy initiatives are ap-
proved at the state level with the political support of the Governor 
and legislative leaders, again the substantive negotiation largely takes 
place outside of the political spotlight, guided by state officials.  The 
resort to waiver by the executive also represents his conscious at-
tempts to work around Congress in implementing policy.  In the af-
termath of the failure of health care reform in President Clinton’s 
first term, the waiver process provided an alternative route toward 
health care reform and increased access to medical care.193 
 
190 Id. at 85. 
191 Oregon Health Plan, No. 21-W-00013/10 and 11-W-00160/10 (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services July 5, 2012), available at http://cms.oregon.gov/oha/OHPB/
Documents/cms-waiver.pdf. 
192 Vladeck & Moore, supra note 179, at 723. 
193 WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 183. 
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C.  Delegating Medicaid Transformation 
Though opponents, joined by the Supreme Court, asserted that 
the ACA’s Medicaid provision was unprecedented, the ACA’s re-
quirement that states expand Medicaid eligibility is only the latest in a 
line of expansions of the program since its enactment, but primarily 
in the late 1980s and 1990s.  The most significant expansions took 
place as a result of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Resolution of 
1985 (“COBRA”), which required states to extend eligibility to preg-
nant women and their children, if they qualified for welfare pay-
ments.194  This period also saw allowed expansions of Medicaid eligi-
bility to elderly and the disabled who were not eligible for 
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).  After the Democrats re-
gained control of the Senate in the 1987, these optional expansions 
became mandated on state governments.195  Further expansions of el-
igibility decoupled Medicaid eligibility from receipt of public assis-
tance.  For example, between 1988 and 1989 the income limits for 
Medicaid-eligible pregnant women went from 75% of the federal 
poverty line to 100%.  Likewise for children the cut-off for Medicaid 
eligibility went from 100% to 133%.196  One of the largest expansions 
took place in the Budget Reconciliation in 1990, which mandated an 
expansion of Medicaid to all children through age eighteen with fam-
ily incomes below 100% of the federal poverty line.197 
One of the most significant expansions and transformations of 
Medicaid was the passage of the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (“SCHIP”) as part of the Balanced Budget Agreement in 
1997.  Rather than Medicaid’s open-ended reimbursement structure, 
the SCHIP program gave block grants to states to expand coverage to 
children in families with incomes of up to 200% of the federal pov-
erty level.198  Under SCHIP, states sought to expand Medicaid-eligible 
populations to include the parents of insured children.  Through the 
Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability Initiative, the Bush Jr. 
Administration encouraged states to extend insurance coverage to 
 
194 SMITH & MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS, supra note 148, at 177.  Prior to the Budget Recon-
ciliation the expansion of eligibility to these groups was optional. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 181. 
197 Id. at 182. 
198 OLSON, supra note 146, at 69–71. 
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adults falling within certain income guidelines.199  Each of these 
paved the way for the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion provision. 
The ACA represents the culmination of the effort to enact univer-
sal health care legislation.  Medicaid Expansion plays a crucial role in 
the goal toward universal access to medical care.  The ACA instituted 
several avenues to make universal coverage available.  It prohibits in-
surance companies from denying coverage or increasing premiums 
for individuals with preexisting medical conditions, or rescinding 
coverage or failing to renew insurance contracts on the basis of an 
individual’s health status.200  It provides tax incentives to encourage 
small businesses to purchase health insurance for their employees.201  
It requires certain large employers to offer health insurance to their 
employees.202  It creates health insurance exchanges, which are to be 
established and operated by states to allow individuals and businesses 
to purchase health insurance.203  Most importantly for the challenges 
to ACA’s constitutionality, it also requires that state governments ex-
pand Medicaid coverage to include individuals under the age of sixty-
five, who are not enrolled in other federal insurance programs, and 
whose income does not exceed 133% of the federal poverty level.  
The ACA delegated authority to the Secretary to withhold all federal 
Medicaid reimbursement funds for states failing to expand Medicaid 
eligibility.  Most prominently, the ACA requires individuals to obtain 
“minimum essential coverage” through purchase of health insur-
ance—i.e., the Individual Mandate.204 
The Medicaid expansion will increase—in some cases significant-
ly—the numbers of persons eligible to participate in Medicaid pro-
grams.205  Clearly this means that states will bear an increased finan-
cial burden of providing medical care to these individuals.  The ACA, 
however, provides for increased federal funding to assist states in cov-
ering those who are “newly eligible” for Medicaid.  The ACA sets the 
 
199 Samantha Artiga & Cindy Mann, Family Coverage Under SCHIP Waivers, Kaiser Comm’n on 
Medicaid & the Uninsured (May 2007), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7644.pdf.  
As mentioned above, these expansions took place through the waiver process. 
200 Patient and Protection Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119-1025, 1101 
(2010). 
201 Id. at § 1421. 
202 Id. at § 1511. 
203 Id. at § 1301. 
204 Id. at § 2001. 
205 Studies suggest that states will experience an increase of over 25% in their Medicaid pop-
ulations as a result of the expansion.  See John Holahan & Irene Headen, Medicaid Cover-
age and Spending in Health Reform:  National and State-by-State Results for Adults at or Below 
133% FPL, Table 7 at 41 (May 2010) (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Unin-
sured). 
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federal Medicaid reimbursement rate at 100% for the period 2014 to 
2016, decreasing gradually every year after 2016 to 90% in 2020, and 
thereafter.206  However, the ACA restricts state discretion in changing 
eligibility standards and coverage during this period.  Specifically, the 
ACA requires states to provide medical assistance that is the “bench-
mark equivalent” of any insurance program offered in the insurance 
exchanges.207  In addition, as a condition of receiving federal reim-
bursement funds, the states are required to maintain their eligibility 
standards (i.e., “maintenance of effort”) until the state-based health 
exchanges are declared by the Secretary of HHS to be fully opera-
tional.208 
IV.  BEYOND ALLOCATION:  FEDERALISM’S BUREAUCRATIC LIFE 
The political safeguards model—even in updated form—is built 
on assumptions about the nature of federal and state relations.  Un-
derwriting the model is the belief that both the state and the national 
government are in competition of substantive regulatory authority.  
That is, each governmental sphere’s behavior is governed by its desire 
to maximize its substantive authority, or, at least, to minimize incur-
sions on its authority from other spheres.209  Professor Daryl Levinson 
has called this governing motif into question, arguing that national 
and state officials act both to increase their political support and to 
increase their sovereign control of the policymaking landscape.210  
 
206 Patient and Protection Affordable Care Act,  § 2001(a)(3)(B)(1)(A)-(E). 
207 A benchmark benefits package can be more limited than the traditional Medicaid pack-
age.  States have the option of enrolling expansion-eligible Medicaid recipients in such 
plans.  However, the benefits packages available for Medicaid recipients under the expan-
sion must be the equivalent to benefits packages in the insurance exchanges that states 
might choose to establish.  42 U.S.C. §1396u-7(a)(1), (b)(2)-(3). 
208 Patient and Protection Affordable Care Act, § 2001(b).  However, the ACA provides for 
states to apply for a waiver of their maintenance of effort obligations by submitting certi-
fication to the Secretary of HHS that the state’s budget deficit justifies the eligibility re-
striction.  Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State 
Medicaid Director (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://downloads.cms.gov/ cmsgov/
archived-downloads/SMDL/downloads/SMD11001.pdf. 
209 While not expressed as a struggle for power, the state and national tension has been in-
sightfully articulated by Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s “Un-
steady Path”:  A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1449 
(1995) (arguing that both the states and the national government have incentives to 
“cheat” in their adherence to the requirements of the federal structure). 
210 The search for sovereign authority might not be as distinct as Levinson suggests if we take 
the search for substantive authority to be a search for accountability, which may not be 
very different from a search for political credit for policy successes.  For a critique of the 
obsession with accountability in public law, see Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability 
and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (2005). 
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Levinson’s insights are instructive for this argument’s purposes be-
cause they suggest that the allocation of sovereign authority to either 
the states or the national government may only be one among other 
important aspects of American federalism and its enforcement.  Nev-
ertheless, the ideas of allocation and separation have been among the 
most central in the debates over the growth of the national govern-
ment’s authority, and in debates about the constitutionality of regula-
tory cooperation between the states and the national government.  If 
the accumulation of substantive authority is not central to state con-
ception of effective state autonomy, then how effective are models of 
federalism enforcement premised solely upon power allocation at the 
legislative enactment stage? 
If state governments measure their effective autonomy by their 
ability to affect policy outcomes, then federalism enforcement must 
ultimately take into account the institutions where state policy effec-
tiveness (or impotence) is determined.  This Part’s primary purpose 
is to demonstrate the importance of post-enactment decisionmaking 
in determining the nature of state and national interactions.  By look-
ing at three important programs that exemplify three distinct types of 
cooperative federalism—(1) conditional preemption, (2) conditional 
grants, and (3) mandates—this Part will extend our knowledge of the 
administrative dimension of federalism politics.  Paying attention to 
this dynamic is critically important for any effort to reconsider Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  In addition, this Part takes a different 
track from scholars such as Nugent and Bulman-Posen and Gerken, 
who have suggested that federal-state interaction in the administra-
tive state might be protected through internal structures and pro-
cesses that foreclose the need for more formal enforcement mecha-
nisms. 
A.  Regulatory Federalism as National-State Interaction 
Recent federalism scholarship has paid significant attention to the 
“lived” dynamics of the national-state relationship.211  The primary fo-
cus of much of this scholarship has been the demonstration of the 
ways in which the national-state government interaction is governed 
primarily by forms of negotiation and “uncooperation” between state 
 
211 See generally Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within, supra note 51; Bulman-Pozen & 
Gerken, supra note 40; Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 
(2006) [hereinafter Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation]; Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federal Rules to 
Intersystemic Governance, 57 EMORY L.J.  233 (2007) [hereinafter Ahdieh, Intersystemic Gov-
ernance].  
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and national actors over the implementation of national and state 
policy objectives.212  Its primary thrust, both descriptively and norma-
tively, appears aimed at bringing attention to the mechanisms that 
states have at their disposal to protect themselves from what they de-
termine to be national overreaching.213  This Part’s focus on the ad-
ministrative dimension of national and state interaction highlights 
the significance of national and state interaction in the implementa-
tion of federal policy objectives.  As such, it will demonstrate the im-
portance for contextual analyses of cooperative federalism as against 
abstract conceptions of national and state interaction across wide cat-
egories of program structure. 
B.  Three Examples of National-State Regulatory Interaction 
1. Occupational Safety and Health 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“OSHA”) is a 
federal statute that regulates workplace safety.  OSHA is an example 
of a “substitution approach” to national-state interaction.214  OSHA 
allows state governments to either establish their own safety regula-
tions under the guidance of national parameters, or allow national 
regulation and implementation of the regulatory scheme that 
preempts state law.215  As such, OSHA represents a version of national-
state interaction that allows states to choose whether to “exit” a coop-
erative regulatory relationship by doing nothing.216  The OSH Act ex-
emplifies the reliance of the national regulatory regime on state ad-
ministrative and regulatory capacities for implementing national 
policy.217  These programs represent the national government’s at-
 
212 See generally Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011); Bulman-Pozen & 
Gerken, supra note 40; Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 211; Ahdieh, Intersystemic 
Governance, supra note 211. 
213 See NUGENT, supra note 35. 
214 Frank J. Thompson, The Substitution Approach to Intergovernmental Relations:  The Case of 
OSHA, 13 PUBLIUS:  J. OF FEDERALISM 59, 61–62 (Fall 1983) [hereinafter Thompson, Sub-
stitution Approach]. 
215 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (2006). 
216 As of 1981 only five states had not submitted any plan to OSHA for evaluation.  Today 
there are twenty-one states with approved state plans.  See GREGORY A. HUBER, THE CRAFT 
OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY:  INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL 
REGULATION OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 9 (2007); see also State Occupational Safety and 
Health Plans, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., available at http://www.osha.gov/
dcsp/osp/index.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).  
217 For an insightful discussion of the federalism issues that arise in programs where states 
are called upon to implement national policy, see Stewart, supra note 103 (addressing the 
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tempt to preserve political and financial capital by enhancing its reg-
ulatory capacities without accepting the full costs of either fully dis-
placing state regulatory action, or funding a completely national reg-
ulatory program.218 
The structure of OSHA respects the twin pillars of American fed-
eralism—national supremacy and state autonomy—by having estab-
lished the right of both “eviction” of states from participation in the 
regulation of occupational safety by the national government, and 
voluntary “exit” from regulation by state governments.  Eviction and 
exit represent the embodiment of the national government’s su-
premacy and the state’s autonomy, respectively.219  While the exist-
ence of these options clearly affects the context in which state and 
national interaction takes place, they are the edges of such interac-
tion.  As such, it is likely more beneficial to pay closer attention to the 
actual workings of the national-state interaction where separation, 
though in the background, is not the issue of primary concern. 
a.  History and Structure of Occupational Safety Regulation 
The passage of OSHA in 1970 came in the midst of the expansion 
of national regulatory authority over several areas of American eco-
nomic and social life.220  Prior to the passage of OSHA, the federal 
government’s involvement in the protection of worker safety had 
been relatively limited.221  The regulation of the safety of workers and 
workplaces had been predominantly a state function.  By the 1960s, 
however, workplace safety moved onto the national agenda as a high 
priority.  Several factors affected the prioritization of worker safety at 
the national level, including increased knowledge of work-related ac-
cidents (like mining collapses) and diseases (e.g., black lung).222  The 
push by labor unions to make national regulation of workplace safety 
a legislative priority was the most significant factor in the enactment 
of OSHA.  In 1968, President Johnson drafted a bill empowering the 
Department of Labor to promulgate standards for workplace safety 
 
limits of certain cooperative federalism arrangements after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in National League of Cities). 
218 Id. at 1200–01. 
219 That separation might undermine state autonomy has been emphasized by, among oth-
ers, Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 40, at 1288, and Neil S. Siegel.  See generally Bul-
man-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 40, at 1288; Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alterna-
tives:  A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629 (2006). 
220 For a history of the rise of the OSHA, see CHARLES NOBLE, LIBERALISM AT WORK:  THE 
RISE AND FALL OF OSHA (1986). 
221 See, e.g., Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006). 
222 NOBLE, supra note 220, at 70–71. 
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and to enforce these standards against employers.  Though the bill 
met with resistance from the business community, and was not enact-
ed before the end of Johnson’s term, President Nixon, in an attempt 
to lure working class voters away from the Democratic Party, pledged 
to support national workplace regulations.223 
In addition to standard-setting, OSHA is also empowered to en-
force its standards against employers in violation of those standards.  
The historic role of states in the regulation of workplace safety and 
the Nixon Administration’s willingness to accommodate advocates of 
state sovereignty resulted in OSHA’s cooperative regulatory struc-
ture.224  However, scholars have pointed out that OSHA’s effective au-
thority with respect to the states is compromised by the fact that it 
would not have the resources to effectively carry out its regulatory 
mandate were it to substitute for state resources.225 
Section 18 of the OSHA structured state participation in standard 
setting and enforcement of workplace safety regulations.  Pursuant to 
Section 18(b) of the OSHA, a state can assume responsibility for the 
“development and enforcement of safety and health standards” by 
submitting a State plan for approval by the Secretary of Labor.226  Ap-
proval of the plan by the Secretary of Labor depends upon several 
factors, including:  the designation of a state agency as responsible 
for administering the plan in the state; provision of standards and en-
forcement mechanisms that are “at least as effective” as national 
standards and enforcement mechanisms, and that state agencies will 
have qualified staff and adequate funding to carry out their regulato-
ry responsibilities.227  If a state plan is approved by the Secretary of 
Labor, then there would be a period of cooperative regulatory con-
trol by both the state and national governments.228  During the period 
of overlapping regulatory structure, the state’s compliance with 
OSHA standards and its enforcement are monitored by the Secretary 
of Labor.229  Once the state program receives final approval, after a 
period of approximately three years, national regulatory involvement 
is limited.  Pursuant to OSHA, a state plan may be revoked if the Sec-
retary finds, “that in the administration of the State plan there is a 
 
223 Id. at 90. 
224 For a discussion of the development of cooperative workplace regulation, see HUBER, su-
pra note 214. 
225 Thompson, Substitution Approach, supra note 214, at 68–69. 
226 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (2006). 
227 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(1)-(8) (2006). 
228 See Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Marshall, 570 F.2d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
229 29 U.S.C. § 667(f) (2006). 
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failure to comply substantially with any provision of the State plan.”230  
Alternatively a state may simply withdraw from the regulatory pro-
gram. 
b.  Administrative Implementation of OSHA 
Despite the possibility of state control over workplace safety policy, 
few have taken the step of actually enacting their own standards for 
workplace safety, because as early as 1972 OSHA’s declared policy was 
that any state choosing to establish state-specific standards would have 
to demonstrate that their standards were at least as effective as na-
tional standards, unless state standards were “on a word for word ba-
sis” identical to standards promulgated by OSHA.231  Understandably, 
this has had the effect of limiting the number of states seeking to 
promulgate separate standards rather than merely enforce OSHA 
standards.  Additionally, states seeking to operate their own programs 
are required to make substantial financial commitments, as the fed-
eral government matches only 50% of the overall costs of operating 
the program.232 
OSHA also requires states to articulate their plans for staffing lev-
els so that they could be assessed for adequacy.233  During the Carter 
administration, OSHA mandated that states managing their own oc-
cupational safety programs significantly increase the number of state 
safety and health inspectors over a five-year period.  OSHA proposed 
a 36% increase in the number of state safety inspectors over this time 
period.234  Indeed, even after the election of Ronald Reagan as Presi-
dent, OSHA required states to increase their safety inspector staffs by 
24%.  This would have required participating states to make signifi-
cant “relationship-specific” investments in hiring and training em-
ployees, and established a bureaucracy that had particular interests 
and authority.  The state investment in these relationship-specific re-
sources might make the state more vulnerable in a long-term rela-
tionship with the national government because the cost of exit be-
comes higher for the state.235 
 
230 29 U.S.C. § 667(f) (2006). 
231 Thompson, Substitution Approach, supra note 214, at 64. 
232 HUBER, supra note 216, at 177. 
233 Id. at 176. 
234 Thompson, Substitution Approach, supra note 214, at 64. 
235 For a discussion of the relational impact of asymmetrical investment in relationship-
specific assets, and the ways they undermine the authority that one party might have as 
against another, see CHAD RECTOR, FEDERATIONS:  THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF 
COOPERATION 24–31 (2009).  Rector’s discussion is a political translation of older eco-
 
Oct. 2012] BEYOND SEPARATION 145 
 
However, OSHA’s oversight of state programs is constrained in its 
capacity to impose onerous burdens on state safety regulators because 
of the difficulty of effectively deploying its ultimate weapon of evict-
ing a state from participation in implementing workplace safety.236  
Though the substitution approach to regulatory federalism suggests a 
redundant capacity of federal regulators, the costs of establishing re-
dundancy in actuality limits any agency’s ability to simply substitute 
national regulators for state regulators without regard to the impact 
on program effectiveness.  Also constraining OSHA’s ability to im-
pose burdens that states consider onerous is the nature of the shared 
regulatory project—workplace safety.  The fact that the shared regu-
latory project is of a regulatory and enforcement nature might make 
states less vulnerable if they withdraw from offering such services as 
additional capacity.237  Because workers and citizens do not think of 
the provision of these services until there is a major incident, state 
withdrawal has fewer political costs than they might in other pro-
grams, at least under certain conditions.  Contrary to the case of rela-
tionship-specific asset investments, this condition reduces the costs of 
state exit from participation in the cooperative regulation of work-
place safety. 
The relative ease or difficulty of exit is important for considera-
tion because it impacts the extent to which parties will be empowered 
to protect themselves in the ways that the literature on bargaining 
and rebellion suggest.  However, reliance on such self-help mecha-
nisms as methods of federalism enforcement may be undermined 
where there are structural impediments to effective self-protection, 
such as where relationship-specific investments have been made up 
front.  This is not to suggest that these arguments are wrong in every 
circumstance, it only suggests that we may want to know more about 
particular structures and contexts before withholding access to other 
forms of federalism enforcement. 
 
nomic literature on the relationship between firms under conditions of asset-specificity.  
See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Why Holdups Occur:  The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Rela-
tionships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444 (1996). 
236 HUBER, supra note 216, at 174 (“OSHA has little to gain by revoking state delegation.”). 
237 David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst:  A Functional 
Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 
1245 (2004) (suggesting that the threat of a state being locked into a conditional 
preemption program is smaller than a conditional spending program); see also Thomp-
son, Substitution Approach, supra note 214, at 68–69 (arguing that it is easier for states to 
exit regulatory programs, as opposed to welfare or redistributive programs, because regu-
latory programs generally have less popularity). 
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2.  No Child Left Behind:  Administrative Implementation of Educational 
Policy 
a.  Conditional Policy Implementation:  No Child Left Behind 
 Despite having run a presidential campaign that suggested that 
the national government’s reach had expanded beyond appropriate 
limits,238 President George W. Bush made the passage of the No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001 (“NCLB”) one of his signature domestic pol-
icy priorities.  The NCLB represents a substantial expansion of na-
tional involvement in educational policy in the United States.239  The 
NCLB is primarily an amendment of Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”) of 1965.240  The NCLB amends 
the most important provision of the ESEA, Title I, which “ensure[s] 
that all children have a fair, equal and significant opportunity to ob-
tain a high quality education.”241  The NCLB provides federal funding 
for states whose educational agencies submit a plan to the Secretary 
of Education.242  State governments that chose not to submit plans will 
not receive federal funds distributed pursuant to the NCLB.243  The 
NCLB introduced national policy goals, assessment measures, and 
remediation of state school systems across the United States. 
The primary thrust, and much of the subsequent controversy, of 
the NCLB, has been Title I, Part A of the NCLB.244  With respect to 
the establishment of substantive goals, the NCLB requires each state’s 
plan to “demonstrate that [it] has adopted challenging academic 
content standards and challenging student academic achievement 
 
238 See, e.g., Paul Posner, The Politics of Coercive Federalism in the Bush Era, 37 PUBLIUS:  J. OF 
FEDERALISM 390, 390–412 (2007) (highlighting the anomaly of George W. Bush’s central-
izing policies during his presidency). 
239 See, e.g., Note, No Child Left Behind and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 886 (2006). 
240 Legal historian Tomiko Brown-Nagin has described the ESEA as “the most expansive fed-
eral education bill ever passed . . . . [It] revolutionized the federal government’s role in 
education.”  Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 
ENOTES.COM, http://www.enotes.com/major-acts-congress/elementary-secondary-
education-act (last visited Aug. 18, 2012). 
241 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). 
242 The state plan must be established in consultation with local educational agencies, teach-
ers, principals, pupil services personnel, and administrators.  See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(a)(1) 
(2006). 
243 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g) (2006). 
244 Clearly the primary route by which states received funding under the NCLB, was through 
the Title I funds.  For the 2005–2006 appropriations cycle, NCLB allowed for $22.75 bil-
lion in appropriations for state governments, compared with $14.1 billion for the NCLB’s 
26 other parts.  See Pontiac v. Spellings, 512 F.3d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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standards . . . [that apply] to all schools and all children in the 
State.”245  NCLB requires that the state standards be applicable to eve-
ry child in the state’s public schools.  Although the NCLB allowed 
states to develop the scope of academic areas in which each would es-
tablish academic standards, it required that academic standards be 
established in reading, mathematics, language arts and science.246 
In addition to both substantive achievement goals and assessment 
metrics, the NCLB establishes penalties to be imposed by the states 
against schools (and school districts) that do not meet the Act’s 
achievement goals.  The most severe financial penalty levied against a 
state government is the loss of 25% of federal funds otherwise availa-
ble to the state for failure to “meet the deadlines established . . . for 
demonstrating that the State has in place challenging academic con-
tent standards . . . and a system for measuring and monitoring ade-
quate yearly progress.”247  States (and local school districts) receiving 
funds under the NCLB are required to “prepare and disseminate an 
annual State report card.”248  The reports must include aggregated da-
ta regarding student achievement, comparisons between groups of 
students by race and ethnicity and socioeconomic status, the most re-
cent two-year trend in student achievement, by subject area and 
grade, and graduation rates of secondary schools.249 
Beyond the required assessments and the funding penalties, the 
NCLB requires local school districts to identify schools that fail to 
meet adequate yearly progress measures for two consecutive years. 
The school district is obligated to provide targeted assistance to such 
schools, and to provide the students enrolled in an “identified” 
school the opportunity to transfer to another public school in the dis-
trict, including a public charter school.  Failure to make adequate 
progress for three consecutive years results in the institution of a 
“corrective action” plan for the school.  A fourth consecutive year of 
failure to meet adequate yearly progress results in restructuring of 
the school, which entails the imposition of an alternative governance 
plan.  Restructuring includes requiring the local school district to re-
open the school as a charter school, replace most of the teachers and 
administrators, enter into a contract with an entity with a track record 
 
245 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2006). 
246 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(C). 
247 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g)(1)(A).  In addition, the Act explicitly prohibited the Secretary of Ed-
ucation from granting additional waivers or otherwise extending the deadlines by which 
states were required to comply with the deadlines regarding approval of student achieve-
ment standards.  § 6311(g)(1)(B). 
248 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(A). 
249 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(D)(i)-(viii). 
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of effectively operating public schools, or allow the state to operate 
the school.250 
The NCLB takes the form of many national-state intergovernmen-
tal programs over the twentieth century—the conditional spending 
program.251  Here, the national government conditions state receipt 
of federal funds on the state’s adherence to national policy objectives.  
Scholars of conditional spending grants have highlighted the ways in 
which such grants impact the political agendas within states them-
selves.252  The offer of conditional spending grants impacts the politi-
cal agenda within the state, and has the effect of highlighting a na-
tional policy priority, and placing that policy priority on the state’s 
agenda, whether the ultimate decision is to accept or reject federal 
grant money.253  One need only look at the most recent education ini-
tiative of the Obama Administration, the Race to the Top Program, 
which held out the promise of money to state governments that chose 
to undertake “significant” educational reforms.254  Several state gov-
ernments accepted the challenge, and enacted plans with the hope 
that they would be competitive for the billions of dollars in additional 
federal funding.  To be sure, this program provided significant lever-
age to those factions within state governments to advance a particular 
policy agenda that most directly aligns with the national policy agen-
da. 
Beyond conditional spending’s effect on the state political agen-
da, it has an impact on the power dynamics within the state.  As men-
tioned above, the offer of federal funds attached to specific policy po-
sitions does not merely provide additional leverage to those within 
 
250 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(7)-(8). 
251 David Freeman Engstrom has carefully distinguished different types of conditional spend-
ing programs—dividing among programs that impose “programmatic spending condi-
tions,” “cross-cutting conditions,” and “preemptive spending conditions.”  Within the cat-
egory of programmatic spending conditions, Engstrom distinguishes between those 
statutes that require states to provide services to a particular group of constituents (e.g., 
Medicaid) and those that are more broad-based (e.g., the National Minimum Age Drink-
ing Act).  Despite the fact that one might describe NCLB as a broad-based programmatic 
statute, it seems to share characteristics of both types of programmatic spending condi-
tions of which Engstrom speaks.  This is significant in the light of the impact, according 
to Engstrom, that a more targeted conditional spending program has on the state’s ability 
to effectively protect itself against impositions by the national government.  See generally 
Engstrom, supra note 237. 
252 See, e.g., id.; Stewart, supra note 104, at 1254 (suggesting that federal grants and conditions 
interfere “with local mechanisms of political decisionmaking”). 
253 MARTHA DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS:  PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN 
MASSACHUSETTS (1970). 
254 Greg Toppo, Race to the Top Education Grants Propel Reforms, USA TODAY (Nov. 4, 2009), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2009-11-04-obamatop04_st_N.htm. 
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the state whose policy choices align most directly with the national 
policy objectives, but conditional spending has a significant impact 
on the internal dynamics of state governance by either establishing or 
empowering institutions within the state bureaucratic landscape that 
have a predisposition to the acceptance and advancement of federal 
policy norms.255 
Though Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have highlighted 
state “rebellion” to the NCLB through the passage of resolutions of 
opposition and litigation, negotiation has marked national and state 
interaction in the most recent period.  Like the Medicaid program, 
the NCLB empowers the Secretary of Education to grant waivers to 
state governments for some of the Act’s requirements.  In order to 
receive a waiver states must submit waiver application to the Secre-
tary.  The waiver must articulate “specific measurable educational 
goals . . . and the methods to be used to measure annually such pro-
gress for meeting such goals and outcomes.” 
One of the most significant implementation efforts was the De-
partment of Education’s decision to include students with disabilities 
and English-language learners in its measures for determining state 
accountability.256  This has resulted in substantial conflict between the 
states and the Department of Education.  Studies show that states 
with larger numbers of English language learners were much more 
likely to oppose the implementation of the NCLB than states with 
fewer such students.257  One of the first major policy changes to the 
implementation was the Department of Education’s decision to allow 
states to remove these students from states’ assessment measures.  
The waiver of the NCLB obligations in this specific area foretold the 
wider use of waivers in the implementation of the NCLB reforms of 
the previous decade. 
Another measure that caused significant impact on state govern-
ments was the NCLB’s Highly Qualified Teacher requirement 
(“HQT”).  The HQT provision requires that every student be taught 
by a teacher who is state certified, possesses an undergraduate de-
 
255 See generally KIMBERLEY S. JOHNSON, GOVERNING THE AMERICAN STATE:  CONGRESS AND THE 
NEW FEDERALISM, 1877–1929, at 9 (2007) (discussing the national requirement for states 
to establish particular bureaus as a condition for state receipt of federal funds). 
256 34 C.F.R. § 200.6(b)(4) (2011) (allowing states to classify recently arrived students—ten 
or fewer months of school in the United States—as Limited English Proficiency, and al-
lowing states to exclude these students from assessments of state proficiency in language 
arts). 
257 See Bryan Shelly, Rebels and Their Causes:  State Resistance to No Child Left Behind, 38 PUBLIUS: 
J. OF FEDERALISM 444, 444–68 (2008) (noting that states with higher levels of limited Eng-
lish proficient students were more likely to resist NCLB). 
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gree, and demonstrates mastery of pedagogy in their subject area.258  
States were required to meet this mandate by 2005, but this deadline 
was ignored by the Secretary of Education in favor of a more state-by-
state assessment.259 
In August 2011, Secretary of Education Arne Duncan announced 
that he would overrule the central provision of the No Child Left Be-
hind Act by waiving the requirement that 100% of students in the 
United States be proficient in math and reading by 2014.  States 
would be allowed to apply for waivers from the Act’s accountability 
provisions, but would be granted waivers only if they were deemed to 
have undertaken efforts to improve student performance.  Secretary 
Duncan’s announcement is the latest in the ongoing debate between 
states and the national government over the implementation of 
NCLB, especially over national measures of success.  An example of 
the disparity between state and national measures is the fact that by 
national measures under NCLB, 89% of Florida’s schools have failed 
to meet federal targets, while 58% of Florida’s schools received an A 
under the state’s measure of academic success.  As of the end of May 
2012, the Secretary of Education had approved nineteen waiver ap-
plications.  An additional eighteen states are in the process of apply-
ing for waivers from the Secretary. 
While there has been some criticism of a perceived power-grab by 
the executive, NCLB grants significant authority to the Secretary to 
approve waivers from the Act’s requirements.  This is simply the latest 
round between the Department of Education and state-level educa-
tion officials to increase student performance.  However, it provides a 
telling example of the central role that agency administrators play in 
determining national-state interaction through policy implementa-
tion. 
The most significant implementation mechanism of the most sig-
nificant education policy in “education federalism” demonstrates the 
bureaucratic dimension of federalism enforcement.  The bureaucra-
cy, as a site of federalism enforcement, embodies the entanglement 
between state and national policy makers that exemplifies coopera-
tive federalism.  This entanglement demonstrates the conceptual in-
consistency between the effective protection of state interests and the 
dominance of separatist commitments in federalism jurisprudence. 
 
258 20 U.S.C. § 6319(a)(1) (2006); 20 U.S.C. § 7801(23) (2006). 
259 Letter from Margaret Spellings, Secretary of Education, to Chief State School Officers 
(Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/secletter/051021.
html. 
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3.  Conditioned Participation/Unconditional Regulation:  REAL ID Act 
As a response to the 9/11 terrorism attacks, the 9/11 Commission 
proposed that the national government impose standards for the is-
suance of identification documents, including birth certificates and 
driver’s licenses.260  In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven-
tion Act of 2004,261 the Congress instituted negotiated rulemaking 
processes, which included state governments, to establish standards 
for new driver’s licenses.  Subsequently, Representative James 
Sensenbrenner (R-WI), then-Chair of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, continued to pursue the establishment by Congress of national 
ID standards.  Sensenbrenner repackaged his proposal, and included 
it in a “must pass” bill that the House of Representatives considered 
in 2005, a supplemental appropriations bill funding the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.262 
 
260 Though the national government might have chosen to issue a “national” identification 
(ID) card, this choice was preempted by Homeland Security Act, which denied to the 
Department of Homeland Security the authority to establish a national ID.  The choice 
not to establish a national ID system was a choice to rely on the state-based ID system.  As 
such the REAL ID Act is an instance of the interactive policy for the implementation of 
national security interests. 
261 REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 199 Stat. 202(a)-(b) (2005).  Some state motor vehicle 
administrators had favored establishing national standards as a way of forcing some states 
to enact such standards where they had resisted doing so voluntarily.  In fact, state and 
local agencies had sought federal assistance in developing in adequate security protocols 
after the 9/11 terror attacks.  The failure of states to act together to develop minimum 
standards for ID security is an example of the sorts of dilemmas that “vanguard” states 
face whenever they make a choice to implement a particular policy.  That is, that the fail-
ure of other states to enact similar policies undermines their efforts to move in a particu-
lar policy direction.  States who seek to move above some minimum to protect or improve 
environmental quality face similar challenges.  These challenges underwrite arguments in 
favor of national regulation of particular areas.  For a general discussion of this as a justi-
fication for national legislative authority, see Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective 
Action Federalism:  A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010).  For a 
discussion within the context of environmental law, see RICHARD LAZARUS, THE MAKING 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004).  
262 For descriptions of the passage of the REAL ID ACT, see Priscilla M. Regan & Christo-
pher J. Deering, State Opposition to REAL ID, 39 PUBLIUS:  J. OF FEDERALISM 476, 479–80 
(2009); Paul Posner, The Politics of Coercive Federalism in the Bush Era, 37 PUBLIUS: J. OF 
FEDERALISM 390, 397–99 (2007).  It is significant that the legislation was enacted as part of 
a larger legislative package, whose passage was all but guaranteed, in light of its im-
portance in the prosecution of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Even those who believe 
that the political process is the only institutional site for the protection of state interests 
might conclude that the REAL ID Act’s passage undermines a commitment to a fair polit-
ical process of federalism politics.  That is, that the process has failed in some important 
way to provide for the protection of state interests in a way that the Garcia Court seemed 
to indicate when it concluded that the judiciary had no role in enforcing legislative fed-
eralism.  For a reading of Garcia that suggests that it commits to a “fair” politics of federal-
ism, see Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349 (2001).  See 
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In May 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act.  The REAL ID 
Act prohibited federal agencies from accepting any identification 
card that failed to meet the standards that the Act established.263  The 
REAL ID Act imposed “minimum document” requirements that de-
tailed what a state-issued ID had to include to meet the standards for 
acceptance by a federal agency.  These requirements include, a digi-
tal photo of the individual, physical security features—e.g., holo-
grams—to prevent tampering or counterfeiting, and the inclusion of 
common readable technology that included “defined minimum data 
elements.”264  In addition to the document requirements, the Act im-
posed “minimum issuance standards” on state departments of motor 
vehicles.  The REAL ID Act also prohibited states from issuing a “fed-
erally approved” ID to illegal aliens, which was the practice of at least 
ten states. 
The REAL ID Act requires states to implement the national stand-
ards by May 2008.265  The costs to state governments to implement the 
REAL ID requirements were estimated at $23 billion over the first five 
years.266  The bulk of the costs would arise from the requirement that 
all of the nation’s state-issued ID’s be re-issued to comply with the 
REAL ID Act requirements.  The national government has allocated 
almost $500 million in grants to state governments to defray costs of 
implementing REAL ID requirements. 
How does one characterize the REAL ID Act as a form of national-
state interaction?  Here, the national government has foregone the 
exercise of substantive regulatory authority that it likely possesses to 
simply establish a national identification card.  Similarly, the national 
government is not simply imposing conditions on the receipt of fed-
 
also Richard Levy, New York v. United States:  An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, 
History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. KANS. L. REV. 493 (1993). 
263 One of the most significant restraints imposed by the Act is the prohibition on the ac-
ceptance of non-complying state ID’s for airline travel. 
264 Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 202(a)-(b) (2005). 
265 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has given states waivers and extensions 
on the date by which they are required to have implemented the REAL ID Act standards.  
To date, the DHS has issued three separate extensions (from the original May 2008 dead-
line to December 2009, and from December 2009 to May 2011).  Most recently, Secretary 
Janet Napolitano has issued another extension to state governments to comply with the 
REAL ID, pushing the date to January 2013.  See Stephen Clark, Homeland Security Delays 
Launch of REAL ID Act Again, FOX NEWS (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/ poli-
tics/2011/03/05/homeland-security-delays-launch-real-id/. 
266 Regan & Deering, supra note 262, at 480 (providing estimates from the National Gover-
nors Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the American Asso-
ciation of Motor Vehicle Administrators).  The DHS also gave estimates for the cost to 
states for implementing the REAL ID Act requirements.  Its estimates for state costs 
ranged from $10–14 billion. 
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eral grant money for the achievement of national policy objectives.  
Nor is it giving the states the option of regulating according to its 
specifications lest it occupy the regulatory field.  As pointed out 
above, the national government has attempted to leverage its authori-
ty in one area—its authority to determine what identification is ac-
ceptable by federal agencies—to impose obligations on state govern-
ments to meet nationally-articulated requirements.  A state failing to 
comply with the national identification standards runs the risk of hav-
ing its state IDs rejected by national agencies. 
Scholars have demonstrated the extent to which states have re-
belled against the impositions of REAL ID.267  These demonstrations, 
and their efficacy, need not lead to the conclusion that state resort to 
self-help is the sole enforcement of federalism possible in state-
national interactions that are dominated by agency decisionmaking. 
Each of these examples demonstrates the extent to which policy 
objectives articulated in the national legislature are predominantly 
implemented in the context of administrative agencies.  These brief 
descriptions in this Part do not attempt to make a grand claim about 
the nature of national-state interaction in administrative agencies, but 
rather asserts that the administrative agency is a principal site of fed-
eralism inquiry, and as such must be engaged for any attempt to 
think about federalism enforcement in a larger context. 
V.  THE SPENDING CLAUSE AND THE GHOST OF SEPARATION 
One might have reasonably understood the Supreme Court’s af-
firmation of Hamilton’s broad interpretation of the Spending Clause 
as a rejection of separation as the dominant motif in federalism en-
forcement.268  Legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause 
has resulted in significantly more inter-jurisdictional governance in 
significant policy areas from medical care for the poor to educational 
standards in local school districts.  Yet, the specter of separation con-
tinues to influence thinking about the Spending Clause.  The notice 
principle—the primary post-Dole v. South Dakota Spending Clause 
constraint—and the scholarly elaboration of the coercion doctrine 
evidence separation’s conceptual dominance in framing the national-
state relationship.  Dole’s notice principle further underwrites the 
Court’s decisive turn toward contract as the governing metaphor for 
the relationship between the national government and the states in 
 
267 Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 40, at 1282. 
268 See discussion in Part I.A.1. 
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Spending Clause jurisprudence.269  Further, each of the opinions in 
National Federation collapses the coercion doctrine into another ver-
sion of the notice analysis, only further enhancing the dominance of 
the contract metaphor in Spending Clause analysis.  Though the con-
tract metaphor itself need not focus exclusively on the initial enact-
ment, ultimately this dominates both Chief Justice Roberts’ and Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s analysis. 
Though the Medicaid decision generated three separate opin-
ions—none garnering a majority—each accepts the dominant sepa-
ratist vision of federalism enforcement.  Even where the opinions ap-
pear to recognize the significance of the implementation of Medicaid 
policy, their conclusions ultimately rely on frameworks that empha-
size Congress’s role as the singly important site of national-state in-
teraction and federalism enforcement.  This Part will provide a brief 
overview of the Supreme Court’s Spending Clause jurisprudence, in-
cluding its coercion jurisprudence, to demonstrate the dominance of 
the separatist vision.  It will also discuss the Court’s opinions in Na-
tional Federation as only the latest examples of the temporal and insti-
tutional truncation of federalism enforcement.270 
 
269 Certainly the contract metaphor predates Dole.  But Dole reinforces the contract metaphor 
already present in the jurisprudence.  See David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Feder-
al Spending Power, 52 S.D. L. REV. 496 (2007) (arguing that the clear statement principles 
of Dole exhibit a commitment to a contractarian approach to conditional grants). 
270 The Court’s failure to transcend the truncated model of federalism enforcement is all the 
more troubling in the light of the appellate court’s decision on Medicaid Expansion.  
Though the court upheld the Medicaid Expansion provision, it did not reject the possibil-
ity that post-enactment actions might underwrite a finding of coercion.  The court’s deci-
sion also relies on a factor that recognizes the intertemporal nature of policy implemen-
tation in the regulatory context.  Of the four factors underwriting its holding, the court’s 
final factor recognized that the ACA had delegated discretion to the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services in determining the nature of the penalty to be imposed for a state’s 
unwillingness or inability to act consistently with the demands of national policy priori-
ties.  The shift in attention is critical to the extent that it opened federalism jurisprudence 
to an appreciation of the multi-cited nature of federalism decisionmaking.  An apprecia-
tion of the intertemporal, inter-institutional nature of federalism decisionmaking also in-
creases the recognition that national-state interactions are embedded in a host of details, 
and that the attempt to merely identify the site of sovereign authority and to separate it 
from contamination with other exertions of power is exactly inconsistent with what states 
may need most.  This understanding of the nature of the implantation dynamics of feder-
alism may suggest the development of behavioral norms—whether we term them en-
gagement or other norms—that are cognizant of the deeply embedded nature of national 
and state interactions and the federalism doctrine that seeks to regulate it.  Importantly, 
at the oral argument on the Medicaid Expansion, both Justices Breyer and Kagan sug-
gested that administrative law was capable of resolving the question of the rationality of 
the Secretary’s exercise of her authority to withhold all federal Medicaid funds.  Though 
they have seemingly abandoned this position, this Article attempts to explain why this po-
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A.  Spending Clause Jurisprudence:  The Ghost of Allocation 
1. Spending Clause Case Law 
a.  A Brief History of Spending Clause Doctrine 
Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution empowers Congress 
to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of 
the United States.”  The Supreme Court, even at the height of the 
dual sovereignty era of the early New Deal, interpreted congressional 
Spending Clause authority broadly.  In United States v. Butler,271 the 
Court resolved a longstanding debate regarding the scope of Con-
gress’s authority under the Spending Clause.  There, the Court held 
that “the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public mon-
eys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative 
power found in the Constitution.”272 
In South Dakota v Dole, the most important Spending Clause case 
since Butler, the Court addressed a challenge to the constitutionality 
of a federal statute that empowered the Secretary of Transportation 
to withhold a portion of the state’s federal highways funds if the state 
failed to adopt a minimum drinking age of twenty-one years.  South 
Dakota challenged the statute as a violation of the Spending Clause.  
The Dole Court reaffirmed Butler’s holding, saying:  “[O]bjectives not 
thought to be within Article I’s enumerated legislative fields may nev-
ertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the 
conditional grant of federal funds.”273 
Though the Court has interpreted the spending power as trans-
cending the limitations on the legislative power, the Court has de-
clared that the spending power is not unlimited.  In upholding the 
statute in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court articulat-
ed four constraints on the exercise of the spending power.  First, the 
limitation is that the “the spending must be in pursuit of the general 
welfare.”274  Second, any condition placed upon the receipt of federal 
funds must be done explicitly—commonly understood as a clear-
 
sition is a better framework for enforcing federalism in a cooperative era.  See generally 648 
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). 
271 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
272 Id. at 66. 
273 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (internal citations omitted) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
274  Id. at 207. 
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statement requirement.275  Third, the conditions placed on the receipt 
of federal funds must be related to federal interest, in particular fed-
eral projects or programs—known as the germaneness requirement.276  
Fourth, a condition may not induce a state to violate a separate con-
stitutional provision.277 
b.  The Clear-Statement Principle and Separatist Federalism 
Enforcement 
The most important of the Dole constraints has been the clear-
statement requirement.278  The Court has imposed clear-statement 
requirements in many contexts to protect constitutional values.279  
The roots of the clear statement requirement in the context of spend-
ing clause legislation lie in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halder-
man,280 in which the Supreme Court held that a condition could not 
be imposed upon a state unless it receives notice.  There, the Court 
analogized legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power to a 
contract between the national government and the states.  The Court 
concluded that like all contracts, the terms of obligation must be ex-
plicit and understood by each party at the outset.  The Court de-
clared:  “The legitimacy of Congress’s power to legislate under the 
spending clause thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and know-
ingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’  Accordingly, if Congress in-
 
275  Id. 
276  Id. 
277  Id. at 208. 
278 See e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 394 (arguing that the Roberts Court will continue to 
apply the clear statement rule in Spending Clause enforcement); Engdahl, supra note 
269.  But see Brian Galle, Getting Spending:  How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear 
Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155 (2004) (arguing 
against clear statement rules as intrusive and overly protective of state governments).  Gal-
le’s critique suggests that clear statement rules in aid of federalism enforcement over-
enforce federalism values and under-enforce other constitutional values, such as com-
mitment to equality principles.  See id. at 183 (“Probably the most important justification 
for the clear statement rule is as a second-best tool for judicial enforcement of federalism 
values.”).  See also Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implica-
tions for States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441 (2008) (critiquing the 
Court’s failure to provide appropriate guidance in its spending clause case law). 
279 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:  Clear Statement 
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598–629 (1992) (surveying the 
various applications of the clear statement rule in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts); see 
also Copeland, Federal Law in State Court, supra note 46, at 545–46 (discussing the Court’s 
use of the clear statement rule in Gregory v. Ashcroft to uphold federalism values). 
280 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
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tends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must 
do so unambiguously.”281 
The clear-notice requirement and the contract metaphor have 
played a significant role in litigation over the spending clause.  Chal-
lenges to spending legislation have primarily involved a challenge to 
the clarity with which particular conditions were declared in enacting 
legislation.282  To the extent that the clear-statement requirement re-
inforces a contract metaphor in Spending Clause disputes, it contrib-
utes to the jurisprudential reliance on separation as the foundation 
for safeguarding the Constitution’s commitment to federalism.  Its 
depiction of Spending Clause legislation as an offer to contract em-
phasizes the independence and voluntary choice of the state govern-
ments.283  Further, the emphasis on clear statements in legislative en-
actments highlights the inauguration of a particular “agreement” as 
the most significant temporal determinant of the legitimacy of condi-
tions imposed under the spending clause legislation. 
The maintenance of the state’s independence and voluntary 
choice serve as the fundamental dimension of the protection of state 
governments from being overburdened by national impositions in 
the Spending Clause context.  The state’s free and voluntary choice is 
a constitutive element of its sovereignty.  To the extent that the state 
remains free at the initiation of the “contract,” federalism is effective-
ly enforced.  The deployment of the clear statement principle ap-
pears inconsistent with the possibility that sovereignty might be exer-
cised in contexts where exit is a less than optimal choice.  State 
participation in the implementation of federal policy—whether in 
the context of environmental policy, occupational safety and health 
policy, or Medicaid—involves significant state investment of resources 
that are not easily recouped, which impacts their ability to exit even 
problematic relationships.  Nevertheless, state involvement in policy 
implementation gives them “voice” in the shape of policymaking in 
ways that would not be the case if they remained independent of the 
national government in these arenas.284 
Though National Federation involved the issue of coercion, which is 
separate from the Dole factors,285 and included the clear-statement re-
 
281 Id. at 17. 
282 Samuel R. Bagenstos, supra note 16; Engdahl, supra note 269. 
283 On the centrality of autonomy in liberal contract theory, see MICHAEL J. TREBILOCK, THE 
LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 8–9 (1993). 
284 For a discussion of the extent to which the ability to decide presents the authority to dis-
sent, see Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005).  See also 
Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L. J. 2633 (2006). 
285 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 16, at 372–79. 
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quirement, each of the Court’s opinions collapsed the clear state-
ment requirement in their discussion of the coercion claim.  No 
opinion is more emblematic of this reliance than Justice Ginsburg’s, 
which is why it merits discussion as a discussion of the clear statement 
requirement.  Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice So-
tomayor, concluded that the ACA’s delegation to the Secretary of 
HHS the discretion to withhold all federal reimbursement funds if a 
state opted not to expand its eligibility for Medicaid, was not uncon-
stitutionally coercive.  Despite her recognition of the implementation 
stage of Medicaid policy, her opinion rests solely within the frame-
work of the clear statement analysis. 
If the Chief Justice’s opinion and the joint dissent rest on a dis-
missal of the implementation of the Medicaid program over the last 
two generations, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent succumbs to the tempta-
tion of separatism by simultaneously recognizing the changes in Med-
icaid over time, without endowing them with any significance for the 
relationship between the national and state governments.  Specifical-
ly, Justice Ginsburg’s defense of the constitutionality of the Expan-
sion provision, including the withholding of funds, rests on her con-
clusion that Congress’s 1965 notice to the states regarding its 
authority to change the program provided notice to the state gov-
ernments that is sufficient to defeat a claim of coercion.  To this ex-
tent, nothing that takes place after the initial enactment matters for 
the analytical framework for the determination of coercion, despite 
the fact that state governments (or the federal government) might be 
made into the a more vulnerable party over time.  Under Justice 
Ginsburg’s analysis, parties must bargain for the full range of changes 
in the relationship at the initial enacting moment, or forever hold 
their peace. 
For Justice Ginsburg, if Congress had adequately informed the 
states in 1965 of its reservation of authority to change the Medicaid 
program, coercion was a theoretical impossibility.  Leaving to one 
side any determination of whether Ginsburg’s conclusion was correct 
in this specific dispute, the larger issue is her unwillingness to accept 
the theoretical possibility that a cooperative program might develop in 
a way that would actually support a claim of coercion, even where the 
technical requirements of notice had been met.  This is all the more 
troubling in the light of Justice Ginsburg’s recognition of the im-
portance of the dynamics of the national-state interaction at the poli-
cy implementation stage. 
Ginsburg resists the temptation to disconnect the ACA from the 
history of Medicaid’s transformation since its initial enactment; she 
points to several enlargements of the program, some of which re-
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quired states to comply or risk losing all of their Medicaid funds.  
However, despite Ginsburg’s attention to the interaction between the 
states and the national government that marks Medicaid’s implemen-
tation, she accepts state autonomy as the only metaphor for federal-
ism.  For example, she points to the Medicaid program as “empow-
er[ing] States to select dramatically different levels of funding and 
coverage, alter and experiment with different financing and delivery 
modes, and opt to cover (or not to cover) a range of particular pro-
cedures and therapies.”286  Ginsburg points to these as examples of 
the Medicaid program’s respect for state autonomy.  Though they are 
surely examples of respect for the role that states play in the effective 
delivery of medical services for the poor or establishing policies that 
might work more effectively, attention to the process by which states 
gained the opportunity to undertake departures from the Medicaid 
program, might not be defined as state “autonomy.”  As stated above, 
states must receive approval from the Department of Health and 
Human Services to depart from the strictures of the Medicaid pro-
gram.  As Professor Gerken has pointed out, the effective exercise of 
sovereignty might not involve separation, but rather entanglement 
with the national government in the implementation of policy. 
Though Ginsburg’s opinion rhetorically resists the dominance of 
separatism in her affirmation of cooperative federalism, its analytical 
reliance on the clear statement framework, and the evidence that sat-
isfies her inquiry, elevates a state’s free choice as the sine qua non of 
the exercise of sovereignty.  Ginsburg’s reliance on free choice suc-
cumbs to the dominance of separatism because sovereignty is equated 
with some period prior to entanglement.  Thus, participation in the 
Medicaid program becomes a compromised sovereignty or autono-
my, justified only because it was freely given away at the initial, unen-
cumbered stage.  It becomes impossible, then, to take into account 
how the contractual relationship has developed through the five dec-
ades of the Medicaid program’s existence.  For Justice Ginsburg, the 
history of Medicaid’s implementation stands only to support the con-
clusion that Congress spoke clearly in the initial enactment of Medi-
caid.  Moreover, this is the only time frame and institutional actor 
that presumably matters. 
 
286 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2632 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers:  
The Submerged Constitution of American Healthcare, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 233 
(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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2.  Coercion and the Tenth Amendment 
a.  Coercion Doctrine and the Specter of Separation 
The Supreme Court’s initial engagement with the theory of coer-
cion came in Steward v. Davis,287 where the Court addressed a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the unemployment provisions of the 
Social Security Act.  A private employer challenged the Act as coer-
cive of state governments because it induced states to enact unem-
ployment compensation programs.  The plaintiff asserted that state 
participation in the unemployment compensation fund was the result 
of national coercion to force state governments to enact unemploy-
ment compensation funds.  The Court rejected the notion that the 
existence of an explicit motive by the national government to en-
courage states to enact unemployment compensation plans amount-
ed to coercion of states.  The Court suggested that a theory of coer-
cion of this sort would eviscerate all possibility of choice in response 
to federal inducements and incentives.  However, the Court indicated 
that even where such coercion might be held to exist, the determina-
tion would be one of degree, rather than a determination of the 
transgression of a bright line rule demarcating a state’s free choice 
from the national government’s coercion. 
In two contemporary decisions, the Court has reaffirmed, without 
elaboration, the theoretical possibility that the national government 
might be guilty of turning pressure into compulsion, thereby trans-
forming inducement into imposition.  In addition to the limitations 
on the spending power discussed above, the Dole Court stated “that in 
some instances the financial inducement offered by Congress might 
be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into com-
pulsion.”288  In Dole, the Court concluded that the withholding of 5% 
of a state’s federal highway funds did not rise to the level of coercion, 
but merely constituted “relatively mild encouragement . . . to enact 
higher minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise choose.”  
The Dole Court did not offer an explanation of why 5% was insuffi-
ciently coercive, or what factors would give a determination of coer-
cion under this framework.  However, the focus on financial induce-
ment played a significant role in National Federation. 
 
287 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
288 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (citing Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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In New York v. United States,289 the Court invalidated a provision of 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act,290 which required state govern-
ments to either regulate the radioactive waste in their borders, or en-
act legislation taking title to such waste, thereby assuming liability for 
damages caused.  Although the Court ruled against this provision on 
grounds that it constituted an unconstitutional commandeering of 
the state’s legislative process, the Court affirmed Congress’s ability to 
achieve its regulatory objectives in other ways, including through the 
Spending Clause.  However, the Court identified the “outright coer-
cion” of state governments as inconsistent with its authority to induce 
state cooperation in its regulatory objectives.  Again, the Court did 
not elaborate on what such coercion might entail, and did not specify 
whether it would adhere to the Dole inducement framework in de-
termining what might constitute “outright coercion.” 
The Dole Court’s treatment of coercion might have provided a 
framework for regulating state-national relationships in the Spending 
Clause context.  The Roberts opinion collapsed the question of coer-
cion into an inquiry based solely on financial inducement.  Even if 
one concentrated solely on the financial inducement for a state to 
participate (or continue participating) in a conditional funding pro-
gram, it is not clear that focusing solely on the percentage of the fund 
reduction, without more, is the best way to determine coercive behav-
ior.  It offered the possibility that the determination of whether a 
funding condition is coercive might involve the engagement with 
facts—the state’s financial condition, for example—that might con-
textualize the state and national relationship.  The Chief Justice’s 
opinion, while teasing us with the possibility of a contextualized coer-
cion jurisprudence, fails to shake free of the separatist paradigm of 
clear statement principles. 
B.  National Federation’s Missed Moment 
The Court’s decision marks the first time in which the Court has 
actually decided that a statute is unconstitutionally coercive, rather 
than merely affirm coercion as a theoretical possibility.  That coer-
cion is possible is an advance against claims that federalism is exclu-
sively enforced through the allocation of substantive authority be-
tween the national government and the states.  Disappointingly, the 
Court’s two decisions finding coercion remain beholden to the 
framework of separation as the sole enforcement mechanism of fed-
 
289 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
290 Id. 
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eralism.  This Part demonstrates how the Court’s reasoning on the 
states’ coercion claim missed a significant opportunity to force feder-
alism enforcement to confront the realities of national and state in-
teraction in the modern regulatory state. 
1. The Court’s Unsettling Middle Ground 
The Chief Justice, writing for himself and Justices Breyer and Ka-
gan,291 held that the ACA’s delegation to the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services the discretion to withhold all federal Medicaid reim-
bursement money from states choosing not to expand eligibility pur-
suant to the ACA is unconstitutional coercion of state governments.  
This holding is monumental in the life of Spending Clause doctrine 
and the coercion claim, as National Federation represents the first time 
that the Supreme Court has held a Spending Clause statute to be un-
constitutionally coercive.  The Chief Justice’s opinion represents an 
important step in acknowledging the intertemporal dimension of the 
Medicaid program in its recognition of the commitments and in-
vestments in administrative capacity that state governments have 
made as participants in the Medicaid program.  The Chief Justice’s 
opinion also recognizes that the loss of a significant portion of feder-
al reimbursement funds has a potentially significant detrimental ef-
fect on state budgets.  However, the Court’s reasoning ultimately re-
lies on an analytically disappointing discovery that appears seemingly 
out of nowhere in Spending Clause jurisprudence.  What is most 
troubling about the solution is not its novelty, but rather its resort to 
the same separation and truncation as the clear statement require-
ment and other forms of federalism enforcement.  The Court seemed 
to move in a direction that suggested that it would take post-
enactment factors into account, yet could not pull the trigger in ar-
ticulating a conception of coercion that lives up to this promise. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion begins with the characterization of 
the Medicaid program, and Spending Clause legislation more broad-
ly, as a contract between the national government and the states.292  
As such, the Chief Justice’s return to the enactment of the ACA might 
appear inevitable but for the fact that the Chief Justice offered the 
 
291 It is clear that Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito did not join the Chief Justice’s 
opinion, but to the extent that the holding, which concluded that the Medicaid Expan-
sion provision was unconstitutionally coercive of state governments, was consistent with 
the views of seven of the nine Justices, it might be appropriate to deem it the majority 
opinion. 
292 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012).  
See also Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation, supra note 16; Engdahl, supra note 269. 
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possibility of moving beyond what might appear to be a mere facial 
analysis of the Medicaid Expansion provision.  The Chief Justice sug-
gested that where Congress’s conditions on states regulated the use 
of federal funds, there would be no coercion claim.  As the donor, 
the federal government could clearly impose restrictions on the use 
of its funds.  The threat of coercion arises where the federal govern-
ment goes beyond assuring the appropriate use of its funds to condi-
tion receipt of funds on the state’s acceptance of a federal policy.  To 
date, the paradigmatic case has been Dole, in which a portion of fed-
eral highway funds were conditioned on a state’s decision to have a 
legal drinking age of twenty-one years.  In such instances, the Chief 
Justice wrote, the analysis was whether the threat of the loss of 5% of 
highway funds was coercive.293  The Chief Justice understood Dole as 
allowing the “inducement” on the ground that the threatened loss 
was only 5% of a state’s highway funds.  While this itself is a mere fa-
 
293 It is important to note how Chief Justice Roberts’ articulation of the conditions under 
which coercion might arise is distinct from that of the leading scholar on the Spending 
Clause, Lynn Baker.  Lynn Baker has offered a “post-Lopez” proposal to substitute what 
she thought as the inadequate Dole test.  See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending Af-
ter Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1962–63 (1995).  Baker’s proposal is based on a two-
step test to determine whether a conditional funding statute violates the Spending 
Clause.  Id.  The goal of the first step is the determination of the germaneness of the 
funding condition.  Id. at 1966.  Not to be confused with what she takes to be Dole’s 
“boundless” germaneness test, Baker’s proposal limits a germane national interest to one 
that “is strictly and unambiguously limited by Congress’s Article I regulatory powers other 
than the spending power.”  Id. at 1966.  A funding condition that seeks to mandate state 
action that transcends Congress’s regulatory authority is presumptively non-germane, and 
therefore invalid.  Id.  The second step of Baker’s test determines whether a presumption 
of invalidity is rebutted.  Id. at 1966–67.  Such rebuttal depends on a determination of 
whether the federal offer of funds is classified as either “reimbursement spending” or 
“regulatory spending.”  Id. at 1963.  Reimbursement spending will rebut a finding of inva-
lidity at step 1, while regulatory spending will not.  Id.  To distinguish between the two, 
Baker provides hypotheticals based on the post-Lopez attempt to encourage states to enact 
legislation criminalizing gun possession in school zones.  Id. at 1963–66.  A statute that 
counts as “reimbursement spending” would offer states funds to defer some or all of the 
costs of prosecuting those charged with gun possession in a school zone.  Id.  A “regulato-
ry” spending statute would condition receipt of federal education funds on the state’s 
provision of universal public education and its enactment of a statute criminalizing gun 
possession in a school zone.  Id.  As stated above, the former statute would be a valid ex-
ercise of Congress’s spending power for Baker, while the latter statute would not consti-
tute a valid exercise of the power.  Id.  Baker’s Article I-based proposal rests a determina-
tion of coercion on the existence of non-existence of substantive regulatory power.  One 
might read Chief Justice Robert’s distinction between conditions that regulate the use of 
federal funds and those that regulate more broadly as broader than Baker’s, however, it 
resists the temptation to connect coercion to the exercise of substantive authority.  I have 
criticized federalism jurisprudence’s reliance on the existence of substantive authority as 
conclusive in determining whether the national government or the states have acted in-
consistent with their obligations to the other level of government.  See generally Copeland, 
Federal Law in State Court, supra note 46, at 556. 
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cial analysis, the Court went further to highlight the fact that the 
“federal funds at stake constituted less than half of one percent of 
South Dakota’s budget at the time.”294  The shift from the 5% at risk 
to a determination of what the 5% meant for a particular state’s 
budget may not appear important, but it suggests that the Court is 
paying attention to the financial and budgetary context in which the 
“inducement” is made. 
The Chief Justice continued in the vein of making a contextual-
ized analysis of coercion.  The Chief Justice sought to distinguish the 
inducement at issue in Dole from the Medicaid Expansion, saying that 
“the financial inducement Congress has chosen is much more than 
[Dole’s] relatively mild encouragement—it is a gun to the head.”295  
The two grounds for the distinction are, first, the percentage of funds 
the state is threatened with losing if it chooses to opt out of the Medi-
caid expansion—up to 100% of all federal Medicaid reimbursement 
funds.  The second distinction is the fact that Medicaid spending ac-
counts for “over 20% of the average state’s budget, with federal funds 
covering 50% to 83% of those costs.”296  The Chief Justice concluded 
that the threatened loss of at least 10% of a state’s budget is so differ-
ent from the loss of one-half of one percent that it amounts to “eco-
nomic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to 
acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”297  Though it is not clear which 
distinction is the engine of the Chief Justice’s analysis, it is an ampli-
fication of Dole, which only mentions the loss of 5% of highway funds 
without addressing the budgetary context into which any assessment 
of coercion is made.298 
One might be forgiven in believing that the Court was developing 
an analytical framework for the coercion claim that pays close atten-
tion to context when the Chief Justice points to the investment that 
states have made in the development of “intricate statutory and ad-
ministrative regimes over the course of many decades to implement 
their objectives under existing Medicaid.”299  The focus on the state’s 
 
294 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012). 
295 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 2605. 
298 Justice Ginsburg raises the uncertainty surrounding the Chief Justice’s analysis, asking 
whether it should matter for a coercion claim that Florida, the lead plaintiff, imposes no 
income tax on its residents.  That a state might have the capacity to raise revenue in rea-
sonable ways, she suggests, might have an impact on a coercion analysis.  Id. at 2640–41 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
299 Id. at 2604.  Here, the Chief Justice’s discussion appears to imply the “relationship-
specific” asset investment, which may create asymmetries between parties in a relationship 
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investment in infrastructure suggests a different path in the contract 
paradigm from contract initiation and notice, to the state’s quasi-
reliance interest developed over the years of participation in the 
Medicaid program.300  This analysis suggests the possibility that the 
coercion analysis will include an assessment of the context in which 
the state and national contractual relationship has developed over 
time, rather than being limited to the time frame of the contract’s 
enactment. 
The hope that the Court would articulate a coercion framework 
more consistent with the actual practice of state and national interac-
tion in the Medicaid program was undermined by the Court’s resort 
to the notice analysis.  Rather than develop a theory of coercion that 
reflects how state vulnerability might be used to the advantage of na-
tional policymakers, which would involve a contextual discussion of 
the ways in which such vulnerabilities might arise and be exploited, 
the Court opted to anchor its analysis in its conclusion that the ACA 
represents so fundamental a transformation of Medicaid that it con-
stitutes an entirely new program.  Leaving aside the Chief Justice’s 
failure to provide a framework for analyzing when an amendment to 
a statute constitutes an entirely new statute, the Court’s decision to 
ground its holding in its novel conclusion shifts the analytical frame 
from the actual workings of the Medicaid program to the point at 
which Congress made the initial enacting decision. 
2.  Context and Separation in the Joint Dissent 
Though Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito agree with 
the conclusion that the Medicaid Expansion provision is unconstitu-
tionally coercive, they wrote separately to emphasize their disagree-
ment with the Chief Justice’s decision to sever the penalty provision 
of the overall Medicaid Expansion provision.301  Though the joint dis-
sent raises points identical to those in the Chief Justice’s opinion, it 
goes beyond the opinion in its argument for holding the Medicaid 
Expansion provision unconstitutional.  Like the Chief Justice’s opin-
ion, the dissent based its conclusion on its assessment that the with-
holding of all federal Medicaid proceeds would significantly impact 
 
that makes one party more vulnerable to extractions from the other party.  See supra text 
accompanying note 235.  But in keeping with the Court’s contractarian approach to 
Spending Clause litigation, it is likely that the Court is relying on a reliance interest ar-
gument. 
300 See discussion of relationship-specific assets as raising vulnerability, supra text accompany-
ing note 235. 
301  NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2667–68. 
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state budgets by withdrawing a significant percentage of federal funds 
from state governments.  However, the dissent went further than the 
Chief Justice’s opinion by grounding its conclusion in what it inter-
preted as a double loss.302  That is, the dissent emphasized the fact 
that Medicaid was funded by taxes paid by individuals, including in-
dividuals residing in a state that might decide not to expand its Medi-
caid eligibility.  These same individuals would be required to contin-
ue to pay federal taxes, even those supporting Medicaid, which its 
state would not receive.  The dissent translated this into a loss for the 
state because the fact of federal taxation would constrain the extent 
to which a state government might increase tax revenues in order to 
replace the loss of federal Medicaid reimbursement funds.  This ar-
gument rests on a strange reading of the relationship between state 
and national citizenship that disregards the fact of connection be-
tween the national government and the states.303 
Though the joint dissent did not question the federal govern-
ment’s right to tax citizens of the United States, it simply declared 
that it was beyond refutation that federal taxes constrained state taxa-
tion.  While this is clearly true, it is far from a complete picture of the 
fiscal relationship between the states and the national government.304  
Though the dissent describes the extent to which federal grants fund 
significant portions of state Medicaid and educational operations, 
among others, there is no discussion of the ways in which a state 
might “cheat” by under-taxing its residents, while depending on the 
federal government to provide funds for important services.  More 
importantly for this discussion’s purpose is the conception that ap-
 
302  Id. at 2661. 
303 By “strange” I do not mean that it is without prior articulation in the Spending Clause 
debates.  Again, Professor Lynn Baker has argued that funding withdrawals that go be-
yond the regulation of the use of federal funds are almost per se coercive because they si-
phon money from the state’s citizens to underwrite the activities of other states that have 
accepted the national government’s policy choice.  Baker suggests that the national tax-
ing power that makes conditional spending possible diminishes the state’s tax base, and 
its access to these tax resources.  The penalization of the a state for rejecting, for exam-
ple, the “regulatory spending” statute discussed above, harms the state doubly, because it 
is obligated to forego even the portion of tax revenues that were collected within its bor-
ders, and the state’s ability to raise tax revenue is compromised because its tax base has 
been encroached upon by the federal tax. 
304  “This is all the more remarkable, in light of the dissent’s recitation of the federal support 
for state Medicaid programs that the dissent acknowledges is long-standing.”  NFIB, 132 
S.Ct. at 2663.  Indeed, the dissent goes on to compare Medicaid to other programs that 
afford states some portion of federal monetary support, including federal financial sup-
port for education.  Though the dissent employs this information to support its conclu-
sion that state loss of Medicaid dollars would cripple the state, it fails to recognize the 
significance of the embedded relationship that its data exemplifies. 
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pears to underwrite the claim that states have a prior right to the re-
sources of its residents that trumps the national government’s right to 
tax.  This reasoning allows the dissent to neglect the ways in which 
fiscal federalism entangles the state and the national government, 
and that Medicaid is a paradigmatic example of such entanglement.  
Further, it appears to let state governments off the hook by not ana-
lyzing the justifications for a state’s decision not to expand Medicaid 
eligibility under the generous terms of the ACA.  That is, the contex-
tualized analysis the joint dissent appears to accept is only applied to 
one party in the relationship.  Why should the national government 
be required to forego its exit option with a partner who has no obli-
gation to explain its reasons for exiting parts of the relationship?  The 
joint dissent’s conceptual framework of separation is exactly incon-
sistent with a coercion analysis that might make any demands of state 
governments in the light of their participation in the Medicaid pro-
gram for the last generation. 
VI.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE NORM OF ENGAGEMENT 
Two significant events have occurred in recent years to bring the 
administrative state’s role in constitutional law to the forefront of le-
gal scholarship.  The first is the increased role of agencies in the 
preemption of state law.  The last several years have witnessed several 
disputes before the Supreme Court addressing the preemptive au-
thority of administrative agencies and the preemptive effect of their 
decisions.305  This activity has increased recognition of agencies as 
sites of federal-state interaction.  First, though not as focused as the 
debates over agency preemption, scholars have drawn attention to 
the interaction between states and federal administrative actors inter-
act over substantive policies in ways that suggest different forms of 
federalism enforcement in the administrative state.306  Second, there 
has been an increase in discussion of the “constitutional” structures 
outside of the written constitution, and their role in determining 
constitutional meaning in the “republic of statutes.”307  Specifically, by 
calling our attention to the quasi-constitutional qualities of statutory 
enactments, scholars have sought to stretch the boundaries of consti-
tutional meaning, at least from a popular standpoint.  Relatedly, 
 
305 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 
(2008) (holding that the Medical Device Amendments preempted state tort regimes). 
306 See, e.g., NUGENT, supra note 35; Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 40; Ryan, supra note 
17. 
307 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 53. 
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scholars have called for an increasing reliance on administrative 
agencies and administrative law as capable of protecting constitution-
al values in the place of more commonly recognized sites and modes 
of protection.308  All of these movements might be understood as a 
part of the larger “constitution outside of the courts” debate in legal 
scholarship. 
As stated above, this Article clearly accepts important aspects of 
the call for a more expansive array of institutions capable of generat-
ing constitutional meaning.  Specifically, the practice of the national-
state relationship must be recognized in all of its dimensions and in 
every site in which it takes place.  Agency practice demonstrates di-
mensions of federalism that are undervalued in dominant thinking 
about federalism enforcement.  As sites where repeated interactions 
take place over periods of time for the achievement of policy objec-
tives, agencies offer a unique perspective on federalism’s bureaucrat-
ic life.  Agencies owe their very existence to the fact that policy im-
plementation is an involved process that involves repeated attempts 
to tailor policy to dynamic circumstances, which is at least one of the 
justifications for congressional delegation to administrative agencies.  
In this respect, the policy implementation process is a microcosm of 
the national-state relationship that also involves repeated transactions 
over periods of time. 
The nature of the repeated interactions between state and nation-
al administrative actors is one marked by negotiation, threats, politi-
cal gamesmanship, explanations, justifications, and reasons.  Above 
all it is marked by engagement, whether that be understood in terms 
of conflict or cooperation, or both simultaneously.  One of the most 
important aspects of national-state interaction in the administrative 
state involves the iterative development of policy.  The examples that 
we have seen in Medicaid and No Child Left Behind are but two ex-
amples of the interaction that takes place in the post-enactment stag-
es of policy implementation.  Here, the most potent tool that either 
the states or the national government have at their disposal is the tool 
of persuading the other side of the correctness of its position.  In-
deed, one of the most the important aspects of the waiver process as 
laid out above is the extent to which it provides the opportunity for 
ongoing engagement with the objective of reaching agreement on 
substantive policy change from the status quo.  Though I am clearly 
 
308 For defenses of agencies as capable sites of federalism decisionmaking, see Galle & Sei-
denfeld, supra note 52; Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 38.  For a rejection of these ar-
guments, at least in their broad sense, see Benjamin & Young, supra note 55. 
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aware that the waiver process puts a different burden on state gov-
ernments than on the national government, the structure of negotia-
tion through explanation and information exchange is institutional-
ized.  As such, the practice of national-state relations offers us an 
opportunity for reconceptualizing federalism enforcement in a way 
that is consistent with values of interaction, rather than separation.  
Such a reorientation at least more accurately reflects a significant di-
mension of the national-state relationship. 
Though administrative practice involves interactions that might be 
best understood as capable of self-policing, administrative law has not 
left the process to its own devices for enforcement.  External en-
forcement, however, has been of a specific type.  The courts have ar-
ticulated doctrines that are capable of legitimating administrative pol-
icymaking in a democracy.  Although these doctrines are not directly 
applicable to the federalism enforcement context, they highlight an 
underlying principle—identified as engagement—as a model for re-
orienting federalism enforcement. 
This argument differs from other recent arguments that recognize 
the importance of administrative agencies in the articulation of our 
constitutional values.  Nevertheless, the argument that follows does 
not claim that agencies ought to be the exclusive site of federalism 
enforcement.  Rather than substitute one form of institutional mo-
nopolization for another, the argument put forward rests on the con-
clusion that administrative law norms might be effectively transplant-
ed into the domain of constitutional adjudication as embodying an 
alternative to the conceptual dominance of separation.  This trans-
plantation will have the effect of transforming the analytical frame-
work for enforcing federalism that sees agencies as constitutional ac-
tors whose interactions with state governments might be investigated 
in determining the constitutional legitimacy of a particular program 
or policy.  That is, the federalism framework that takes engagement 
seriously will not simply examine the handiwork of Congress as the 
sole touchstone for a determination of constitutional validity, but 
may, in certain circumstances, examine the practice of national and 
state interaction in the administrative state. 
A. Engagement in Administrative Law Doctrine 
A survey of two of the most important doctrines in administrative 
law points to the centrality of engagement as a means of establishing 
the legitimacy of administrative decisionmaking.  Judicial review of 
the agency rulemaking process has involved a form of common law-
making aimed at enhancing the opportunity for effective participa-
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tion by stakeholders in agency decisionmaking by overseeing the pro-
cess by which rules are made.309  Likewise, the courts have taken a 
more aggressive posture in reviewing the substance of agency deci-
sionmaking though arbitrary and capricious review.310  Each of these 
expansions of judicial review of agency decisionmaking is aimed at 
protecting agency legitimacy by requiring agencies to:  (1) provide 
forums in which to address the factual, legal, and policy positions of 
“outsiders;” and (2) provide satisfactory justifications of their substan-
tive policy choices.  At their core, each of these underscores to the 
value of engagement as a mechanism for effectuating influence in 
democratic governance.311 
1. Speaking, Listening, and Responding:  Engagement and Agency 
Rulemaking 
Students of administrative law are always surprised by the extent 
to which the courts, understood primarily as the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, have policed the 
rulemaking process without the imposition of explicit tasks to specific 
 
309 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2011) (“‘[R]ule making’ means agency process for formulating, 
amending, or repealing a rule”).  See also CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING:  HOW 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY, (2d ed. 1999) (providing a history 
and discussion of rulemaking). 
310 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  For 
recent discussions of arbitrary and capricious review, see Nina Mendelson, Disclosing “Po-
litical” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010); Kathryn A. 
Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L. J. 2 (2009). 
311 Professor Mark Seidenfeld has argued that judicial enforcement of procedural and sub-
stantive obligations on agency decisionmaking reflects the Constitution’s commitment to 
reasoned decisionmaking, broadly understood.  Seidenfeld has argued that the judicial 
willingness to impose obligations on agencies at the notice and statement of basis and 
purpose stage of rulemaking protect constitutional values of deliberation.  See Mark Sei-
denfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 
(1992).  Gillian Metzger has described these doctrines, particularly the court’s develop-
ment of hard look review, as undergirded by constitutional values of separation of pow-
ers.  She has argued that the failure to impose procedural and substantive obligations on 
agencies would undermine the broad delegations that the Supreme Court has allowed 
since the New Deal era.  Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 53, at 490–97.  
This discussion surely accepts the correctness of Metzger’s position, but differs from 
Metzger’s position in its emphasis on engagement as a norm of constitutional behavior in 
the exercise of authority.  While Metzger emphasizes the role that separation of powers as 
a constitutional value plays in underwriting these doctrinal innovations, I have, perhaps, 
moved a step beyond the text to ground these doctrines in the Constitution’s commit-
ment to reasoned governance.  The conception of American constitutionalism upon 
which the engagement principle rests are as easily associated with deliberative or interest-
group conceptions of politics.  See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984). 
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regulatory agencies’ comment process.312  In the 1980s the D.C. Cir-
cuit gave expanded meaning to the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
(“APA”)313 requirement that agencies issue both a notice for proposed 
rulemaking314 prior to initiating rulemaking, and provide a “concise 
general statement of basis and purpose.”315  In each of these aspects of 
the rulemaking process, the court emphasized the importance of ef-
fective participation by affected parties. 
With respect to the APA’s notice requirement, the courts have 
held that an agency was obligated to provide interested parties with 
“an accurate picture of [the] reasoning that has led the agency to the 
proposed rule.”316  Without such a picture, the court wrote, “interest-
ed parties will not be able to comment meaningfully upon the agen-
cy’s rule.”317  The court reasoned that an agency’s failure to provide 
the “technical studies and data” supporting its proposed rules un-
dermined the interests of affected parties and effective decisionmak-
ing by failing to empower participants in the rulemaking process with 
the information to offer informed criticisms of the agency’s assump-
tions and starting points.  Countenance of what it called an agency 
practice of “hiding or disguising the information that it employs,” 
would turn the comment process—a process that “should be a genu-
ine exchange”—into something different.  The court’s decision was 
based upon its conception of what the comment process was sup-
posed to be.  In the court’s understanding, the “purpose of the com-
ment period is to allow interested members of the public to com-
municate information, concerns, and criticisms to the agency during 
the rulemaking process.”  An agency’s failure to provide the oppor-
tunity for this sort of exchange amounts to a violation of its obligation 
to provide the opportunity to allow affected parties to engage the 
agency at the most significant time of its decisionmaking process.  
The requirement that the agency offer up the foundation of its pro-
 
312 The absence of explicit, judge-made amendments to the rulemaking process was not for 
lack of effort.  The D.C. Circuit’s attempts to impose more formal procedures on infor-
mal agency rulemaking was solidly rebuffed by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).  For an 
analysis of the Court’s rejection of the D.C. Circuit’s attempt to impose additional formal 
burdens, and its implications for administrative law, see Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee:  
The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345 (1979). 
313 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current 
version at 5  U.S.C. § 500 (2006)).  
314 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3). 
315 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
316 Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 535, 530 (D.C. Cir. 
1982).  
317 Id. 
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posed policy means that the agency must make itself vulnerable to 
outside criticism and attack.  It cannot hide behind technical exper-
tise or its commitment to the public interest as substitutes; it must let 
others in on terms that will allow them to impact the agency’s think-
ing and policymaking. 
In addition to the court’s protection of the comment stage as a 
site of meaningful exchange between the agency and affected parties, 
the courts have enforced the agency’s obligation to provide a state-
ment of “basis and purpose” in its final rule.  Though the courts have 
indicated that the statement “need not be comprehensive,” they have 
held that it must “indicate sufficiently the agency’s reasons for the 
rules selected.”318  Much like the court’s policing of the adequacy of 
notice, the court’s attention to the agency’s responsibility to explain 
itself appears to be premised on the fact that the agency is bound to 
explain its decisions to the same parties who have contributed to the 
agency’s decisionmaking.  The agency must adequately lay the 
groundwork for interested parties to speak, but the agency must also 
speak back in the form of an explanation for its choices.  That is, the 
agency cannot immunize itself from the impact of the interaction 
with participants in the policy-making process.  Further, and perhaps 
most importantly, the agency’s response will be judged based upon its 
having responded to external inputs.  In short, this is quite the oppo-
site of our common conceptions of sovereignty and autonomy that so 
often guide our frameworks for federalism enforcement, and that 
were on display in National Federation. 
2. Weighing the Response:  Engagement and Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review 
The courts developed administrative law doctrine in the service of 
agency engagement through the rulemaking process.  However, the 
norm of engagement does not end there.  The rise of “hard look” or 
arbitrary and capricious review expanded the agency’s obligation to 
engage to the realm of an agency’s substantive policy choice.319  Hard 
look doctrine has its roots in cases in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, but gained the approval of the Su-
 
318 Id. at 534–35. 
319 The “hard look” requirement began as the agency’s obligation to carefully consider the 
decision before it.  The “hard look” requirement transformed into the level of scrutiny 
that a reviewing court will hold an agency under certain circumstances, such as an agen-
cy’s change in policy.  See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 
(D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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preme Court in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers v. State Farm,320 in which 
the Court invalidated the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration (“NHTSA”) decision to rescind rules mandating passive re-
straint devices (airbags and automatic seat belts) aimed at improving 
auto safety.321  There, the Court overturned part of an agency policy 
decision on the ground that the agency’s policy choice was not sup-
ported by the record that it had created.  In explaining the scope of 
arbitrary and capricious review, the Court conceded that it was nar-
row and should not be understood as substituting judicial judgment 
for an agency’s judgment, however, the Court continued saying:  
“Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and articu-
late a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational con-
nection between the facts found and the choice made.’”322  Here, the 
Court relied on the fact that the agency was obligated to make deci-
sions on the basis of its record, which presumably included comments 
from parties seeking to contribute to the agency’s policy-making pro-
cess. 
While the Court in Vehicle Manufacturers spent less time on the 
protection of affected parties or interests, it is clear that the Court’s 
protection of the role that the administrative record plays in the 
agency’s decisionmaking benefits those who have contributed to the 
record.  The Court obligates the agency to engage the record that it 
has created as the starting point of its explanations of its policy choic-
es.  These policy choices must make sense in light of the record that 
has been produced.  It is important to note that the Court’s “hard 
look” is deferential to the extent that it only forces the agency to take 
seriously the record that it has created.  The record is both the prod-
uct of engagement, and must itself be engaged.  The agency must lis-
ten, and cannot shut its ears to the contributions of interested par-
ties.  But as important as these are, the agency is forced to speak, and 
in speaking, to explain its decisions by reference to the contributions 
offered.323 
 
320 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
321 For a detailed history of this development, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE 
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990). 
322 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc.  v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
323 Id. 
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B.  Federalism and Engagement in the Administrative State 
1. Agencies as Sites of Federalism Decisionmaking 
This argument rests on the contention that agencies are appro-
priate sites of federalism decisionmaking.  It must be admitted that 
this status has not been accepted in all circumstances.  The Court’s 
case law suggests disagreement and inconsistency regarding whether 
administrative agencies are deficient forums for federalism deci-
sionmaking.  However, there is also case law that appears to recognize 
agencies as legitimate sites of such authority, where appropriate pro-
cedures are followed.  Finally, there is case law that suggests that 
courts have relied on the fact of agency process to rehabilitate what 
might have been constitutionally questionable statutes.  The most 
common criticism against the legitimacy of agencies to make deci-
sions having an effect on state interests is the claim that agencies do 
not (and cannot) effectively represent the interests of state govern-
ments.  These arguments assert that administrative agencies do not 
possess the structural safeguards that legitimize Congress’s assertion 
of authority in ways that affect state interests.  This accepts the argu-
ment that Congress’s constitutional structure provides the necessary 
“political safeguards of federalism,” which justify Congress’s assertion 
of substantive regulatory authority over areas that implicate state in-
terests.324  Building on the arguments that Congress’s structure pro-
vides for the effective protection of state interests, these commenta-
tors argue that administrative agencies do not possess the structural 
protections of state interests of the Congress.  Although the Court has 
never explicitly affirmed the position that agencies are ineligible to 
serve as sites of decisionmaking that might affect states’ interests, sev-
eral of the Court’s cases suggest that agencies are clearly thought of 
as deficient sites of federalism decisionmaking. 
In several recent decisions, the Supreme Court has addressed is-
sues that implicate state interests in decisions made by administrative 
agencies.  In these cases the Court has called into question agency au-
thority to make certain decisions having implications for state gov-
ernments.  For example, in Rapanos v. United States,325 the Court re-
jected the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) interpretation 
of its authority to regulate intrastate, navigable waters.  The Court 
 
324 Bradford Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 91, 92 (2003) (arguing against preemption by administrative agencies as inconsistent 
with the Supremacy Clause). 
325 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
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concluded that the EPA’s interpretation of “waters of the United 
States” to include non-permanent, man-made wetlands “would au-
thorize the Corps to function as a de facto regulator of immense 
stretches on intrastate land.”326  The Court declared:  “Even if the 
term ‘the waters of the Unites States’ were ambiguous as applied to 
channels that sometimes host ephemeral flows of water (which it is 
not), we would expect a clearer statement from Congress to authorize 
an agency theory of jurisdiction that presses the envelope of constitu-
tional validity.”327  In short, even if the Court were willing to grant the 
possibility that the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, to the ex-
tent that such an interpretation (in the majority’s opinion) threatens 
to significantly displace state regulatory authority, the decision must 
be made by an institution (Congress) whose bona fides are more le-
gitimate than an agency.328 
In its decision in Gonzales v. Oregon,329 the Court rebuffed an at-
tempt by Attorney General John Ashcroft to assert control over the 
determination of the meaning “legitimate medical practice.”  After 
the state of Oregon enacted its assisted suicide legislation, then-
Attorney General Ashcroft promulgated an interpretive rule that 
made it a violation of the Controlled Substances Act for a physician to 
assist in the suicide of another.  Though the Court’s analysis tracked 
the analytical framework of the judicial review of agency interpreta-
tion of statutes that it administers, i.e., the Chevron framework, the 
Court’s analysis was not very different from its discussion in Ra-
panos.330  In Gonzales the Court determined that the Attorney General 
was ineligible to receive Chevron deference because it was unlikely 
that Congress had delegated authority to him to make rules with re-
gard to the development of standards for legitimate medical practice.  
Here, the Court did not question the constitutionality of federal reg-
 
326 Id. at 738. 
327 Id. 
328 Here, too, it must be pointed out that the Court does not only require a decision from 
Congress, but also imposes the requirement that the statement be “clear.”  For the feder-
alism-protecting function of clear-statement principles, see Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for 
Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349 (2001).  See also Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 
279. 
329 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
330 The framework articulated in Gonzales was a modification of the original Chevron two-step 
analysis.  Rather than commencing the analysis with a determination of whether a stat-
ute’s meaning was clear or ambiguous, the new formula begins with another two-step 
analysis, asking:  (1) whether Congress had delegated to the agency the authority to make 
rules with the force of law; and (2) whether the agency had acted consistently with such a 
delegation.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill & 
Kristin Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L. J. 833 (2001). 
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ulatory authority over the manufacture or use of prescription drugs.  
However, the Court questioned whether the Attorney General had 
authority to make such a determination in the first instance.  Alt-
hough the Court’s decision raised questions about an agency’s au-
thority to make decisions implicating state interests, the Court’s anal-
ysis suggests that the form of the Attorney General’s decision, the 
promulgation of the regulation as an interpretive rule, rather than as 
a substantive rule that had gone through the notice and comment 
rulemaking process, played a significant role in the Attorney Gen-
eral’s decision.331  That is, the Attorney General utilized a process that 
did not require engagement with “outsiders,” and appeared to have 
gone out of his way to sequester itself from outside input.332 
Further, the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has been im-
pacted by the presence of administrative decisionmaking.  For exam-
ple, in Gonzales v. Raich,333 in which the Court upheld Congress’s au-
thority to regulate medical marijuana against a Commerce Clause 
challenge, the Court held that the fact that marijuana might be re-
classified by the Attorney General as something other than a Sched-
ule I drug did not impact its decision about Congress’ regulatory au-
thority.  Nevertheless, the Court pointed to the availability of a chal-
lenge to the administrative determination of the marijuana’s 
classification at the agency level.  As stated above, in upholding the 
Medicaid Expansion provision, the Eleventh Circuit reference to the 
agency context may have played a larger role in its decision—as it was 
explicitly listed as a factor against finding coercion—these cases sug-
gest judicial cognizance of the administrative realm of policy deci-
sionmaking that has significant substantive impact on state policy 
choice.  Rather than merely seeing this as the judiciary’s endorse-
ment of the administrative law doctrine as the new bulwark against 
national overreach, this Article argues that we might see this as an in-
vitation to draw upon the insights of administrative law’s demand for 
engagement and interaction as offering insights into federalism en-
forcement beyond the agency setting.334  Indeed, it might offer signif-
 
331 See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 38 (arguing that the Court’s discussion is not alto-
gether clear with respect to whether it is federalism or administrative law doctrine that is 
carrying the water in Gonzales). 
332 The Gonzales Court also articulated what has come to be known as the anti-parroting 
principle, which does not accord deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own sub-
stantive rule, where the rule merely “parroted” the language of the statute.  Gonzales, 546 
U.S. at 257–58.  This principle might be related to what I have called the requirement 
that the agency engage, rather than sequester, itself as the Attorney General had done. 
333 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
334 See, e.g., Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 38. 
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icant substantive impact on agencies engagement with the questions 
of preemption of state law. 
2.  Substance and Procedure in Administrative Preemption 
Most recently in Wyeth v. Levine,335 the Court addressed the issue of 
the Food and Drug Administration’s determination that its labeling 
requirements preempted state common law tort actions based on a 
drug manufacturer’s failure to warn.  The Food and Drug Admin-
istration’s (“FDA”) preemption determination had been communi-
cated in the preamble of a rule, rather than in the proposed rule, it-
self.  As such the agency’s determination of the preemptive scope of 
its drug labeling regime had not been submitted to the commentary 
and criticism of a rule going through the notice and comment pro-
cess.  The Court’s analysis of the preemptive scope of the FDA’s label-
ing regime calls into question the legitimacy of administrative agen-
cies as sites of preemption determinations.  Although the Court 
emphasized the FDA’s failure to submit its preemption determination 
to the strictures of public commentary according to Section 553 of 
the APA, its analysis also called into question the very legitimacy of 
agencies as sites of federalism politics.  The Court declared that it had 
recognized the authority of agency regulations bearing the force of 
law to preempt “conflicting” state law, however, it pointed out that 
even here, “the Court has performed its own conflict determination, 
relying on the substance of state and federal law and not on agency 
proclamations of pre-emption.”336  The Court’s statement raises two 
issues with respect to an agency’s authority to make preemption de-
terminations.  First, the Court seems to suggest that only conflicts be-
tween agency regulations and state law might be recognized as the 
basis of the preemption of state law.  This conclusion would limit the 
extent to which regulations might preempt state law.  Second, the 
Court’s statement suggests that whatever the basis of preemption, the 
Court cannot accept the agency’s preemption determination because 
the agency has not been designated by Congress as a legitimate site of 
preemption determinations. 
Despite the Court’s somewhat dismissive treatment of the agency’s 
authority to make preemption determinations, the agency’s opinion 
was not completely ignored.  Although the agency qua agency is not 
respected, the agency as an expert in policymaking and policy coor-
 
335 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
336 Id. at 1200–01. 
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dination and implementation can earn deference through the force 
of its underlying explanations.337  The Court had previously “given 
‘some weight’ to an agency’s views about the impact of tort law on 
federal objectives when the subject matter is technical and the rele-
vant history and background are complex and extensive.”338  The 
Court further explained its posture with respect to agencies, saying:  
“Even in such cases, however, we have not deferred to an agency’s 
conclusion that state law preempted.  Rather, we have attended to an 
agency’s explanation of how state law affects the regulatory 
scheme.”339  Here, there was no basis upon which to accord any 
weight to the FDA’s determination, because the agency had failed to 
allow for participation by affected parties, and failed to offer any ex-
planation for its conclusion that the federal regulatory regime ought 
to monopolize the field with respect to drug manufacturers’ labeling 
obligations.  The Court emphasized what it called the FDA’s “proce-
dural failure” of including its preemption determination in the pre-
amble of the final rule, after the notice for proposed rulemaking ex-
plicitly stated that the rule would not result in the preemption of 
state law. 
The Court did not simply rest its rejection of the FDA’s preemp-
tion on what amounted to a procedural failure, but also highlighted 
what can only be described as the substantive irrationality of the 
FDA’s preemption determination.  The Court’s discussion of the sub-
stantive dimension of the FDA’s decision suggests a model for the 
breadth of the judicial review of the agency’s federalism decision.  
That is, the agency’s decision to withhold funds for failure to expand 
Medicaid would have to meet the requirement of substantive rational-
ity.  This requires a federalism analysis that focuses on the context in 
which particular decisions are made, rather than on abstract concep-
tions of autonomy.  The Court’s substantive review of the FDA’s 
preemption decision provides an example of such a contextualized 
review. 
 The Court declared that the preemption determination at issue 
had “reverse[d] the FDA’s own longstanding position without provid-
ing a reasoned explanation, including any discussion of how state law 
has interfered with the FDA’s regulation of drug labeling during dec-
ades of coexistence.”340  Although the Court appeared to frame its 
 
337 See generally Merrill & Hickman, supra note 330. 
338 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
339 Id. 
340 Id. at 1201.  There is currently some debate about whether an agency change in policy 
position should trigger “hard look” review by a court.  See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n. 
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substantive analysis of the FDA’s preemption determination in terms 
of its reversal of policy, the Court’s analysis actually addresses the 
agency’s failure to provide rational responses to the facts that un-
dermine the agency’s conclusion that federal regulatory policy ought 
to monopolize the source of obligations imposed on drug manufac-
turers.  The Court’s discussion of the FDA’s prior preemption deter-
mination, the Court seems to suggest, is rational in the light of par-
ticular facts that describe the current relationship between the FDA, 
the drug industry, and state tort law.  These facts, which from the 
record have not been contested by the agency, undermine the sub-
stantive rationality of the agency’s substantive decision to reverse 
course.  The Court highlighted the fact that the FDA had limited re-
sources to vigorously police all risks that were identified after a drug 
was approved, and after the FDA’s labeling requirement was imposed.  
Further, the Court highlighted the information inequality that exists 
between the FDA and drug manufacturers, who “have superior access 
to information about their products, especially in the postmarketing 
phase as new risks emerge.”341  The Court asserted that state tort liti-
gation serves an important role in limiting the information gap be-
tween regulatory agencies and private industry because “[s]tate tort 
suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug 
manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly.”342  The information-
disclosing function of state tort law is further enhanced by providing 
incentives (based on the compensatory function of those injured by 
particular products) to victims to “come forward with information” 
not known that may be unknown to both the industry and the regula-
tory agencies.  Tort suits serve a diagnostic function that is important 
for the successful implementation of Congress’ purpose to protect 
consumer safety. 
 As articulated above, the Court’s rejection of the FDA’s preemp-
tion determination could hardly be described as merely a judicial po-
licing of the procedural apparatus of agency preemption decisions.  
The substantive content of the Court’s decision demonstrates the ri-
gor with which the Court is willing to analyze an agency’s preemption 
determination.  The decision stands as an example of the role that 
 
v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  But see FCC v. Fox, 129 S. Ct. 
1800 (2009). 
341 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202. 
342 See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY, PREEMPTION WAR:  WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRATS TRUMP 
LOCAL JURIES (2008) (arguing against preemption on the basis that litigation provides an 
important “feedback loop” to regulatory agencies); David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regu-
latory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95 (2005) (same). 
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the Court might play in the process of policy implementation of fed-
eralism disputes.  Such a role would require engagement on the part 
of both the national government and the states as a basis for deter-
mining the federalism legitimacy of their actions.  Engagement, at a 
minimum, entails non-exclusion from significant policy decisions.  
Rather than forcing separation, federalism enforcement might pro-
tect the efficacy of state contributions to policy implementation. 
C.  Enforcing the Bureaucratic Spending Clause 
This part offers a brief sketch of the coercion analysis in the con-
text of the administrative state.  At oral argument Justice Breyer sug-
gested judicial review of the Secretary’s decision to terminate Medi-
caid reimbursement funds as an alternative to holding the Expansion 
provision to be unconstitutional.343  Though it was not clear whether 
Justice Breyer’s alternative would eliminate coercion as a recogniza-
ble constitutional claim, what is clear is that Justice Breyer offered 
administrative law as the source of an affirmative obligation on the 
Secretary to make a reasonable decision.344  What is significant about 
the Justice’s statement is that it requires a contextualized analysis of 
the impact that the Secretary’s decision to terminate all Medicaid re-
imbursement funds would have on the state government.  It is only 
logical that a determination of the reasonableness of the Secretary’s 
termination decision must take account of the basis of the state’s re-
fusal to expand Medicaid eligibility to comport with the ACA’s re-
quirements.345  The state’s refusal to expand Medicaid must, itself, be 
based on the sort of justification that would support a reviewing 
court’s conclusion that the Secretary acted unreasonably by terminat-
ing all Medicaid funds.  In short, judicial review of the termination 
decision would require an assessment of the information before the 
 
343 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-393).   
344 Though “reasonableness” is most associated with step two of Chevron review, Breyer clearly 
intends reasonableness as the baseline of all legitimate agency action.  Thus, even what 
we consider to be substantive review of agency exercise of discretion, i.e., arbitrary and 
capricious review, is “reasonableness” review.  For a discussion of this, see David Zaring, 
Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135 (2010).   
345  Justice Breyer’s question appears to have suggested that any decision by the Secretary to 
terminate pre-ACA Medicaid funds would be presumptively unreasonable, but this was 
not fully explored.  However, this interpretation of the Justice’s question would beg the 
question of why a reasonableness assessment would offer anything that a simple declara-
tion of unconstitutional coercion would not provide.  Even if the Justice meant that the 
Secretary’s decision to terminate would be per se unreasonable, this discussion suggests 
that such a conclusion would be perfectly inappropriate for administrative law, which ac-
cepts the legitimacy of government action and decisionmaking, but holds such actions 
and decisions to obligations of reasonableness that are always assessed in context.   
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Secretary at the time the decision was made.  This information would 
likely include (or not) a state’s explanation for why its decision not to 
expand Medicaid should not be the basis of the termination of feder-
al reimbursement funds.  There is no way that the Court can avoid at 
least some assessment of the state’s justification for its refusal to ex-
pand Medicaid eligibility. 
 Judicial review in this context is consistent with the engagement 
norm outlined above.  But such review requires engagement from 
both the national government and the states.  Under this conception 
of the judicial review of federalism, the states are no freer to disen-
gage than is HHS.  In addition, the assessment of reasonableness 
necessarily takes into account past decisions made by the agency and 
the states in their temporally-extended interaction.  This does not 
suggest that a state is not free to refuse to expand Medicaid on purely 
ideological grounds, but that the decision (or explanation) will be as-
sessed in making the determination of whether the Secretary’s termi-
nation decision in response is reasonable.  Such a framework recog-
nizes the state’s freedom to refuse to expand Medicaid, but does not 
treat every state refusal in identical fashion.  The Court’s current co-
ercion doctrine allows states simply the option to exit as though every 
termination decision represents the same threat to state sovereignty.  
The framework articulated in this article rejects such an acontexual 
conception of federalism and its enforcement, particularly in the 
regulatory state. 
CONCLUSION  
National Federation’s popularity may be about the Individual Man-
date.  Yet, its future may depend more on what states decide about 
participating in the newly-expanded Medicaid program.  Regardless 
of what happens to this particular provision at either the national or 
state level, National Federation stands as both a missed opportunity to 
offer a conception of federalism that is truer to the practice of “Our 
Federalism.”  The unanimity of the Court’s acceptance of the domi-
nant separatist paradigm only highlights the extent to which those 
who dissent from its incomplete conception of federalism must con-
tinue to demonstrate its costs for our conceptualization of the na-
tional-state relationship, and the actors that shape so much of it.  Giv-
en debates about the nature of state authority to enforce immigration 
policy, and the ability of states to regulate against greenhouse gas 
emissions, conflicts between national and state authority do not 
threaten to become extinct, or easier.  Remaining faithful to our leg-
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acy of policy differentiation that federalism allows, may require reori-
enting our conception of its enforcement for the age it serves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
